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This dissertation studies two topics in the economics of advertising, in the frame-
work of Industrial Organization. It considers the role of advertising in markets with
network externalities in consumption, and advertising as a strategic response of in-
cumbent to new entry.
The rst chapter investigates the incentives for a monopolistic rm producing a
good with network externalities to advertise when consumers face imperfect informa-
tion and therefore must search to realize their actual willingness to pay for the good.
A rm may disclose market information through advertising if it expects this to be
benecial. The results suggest that advertising is more likely in the case of a negative
network e¤ect and less likely with a positive network e¤ect. When a monopolist faces
a strong network externality, it chooses to support the maximum possible network and
charge a price equal to the value of the externality. Finally, depending on the value
of the search cost and type of network externality, a monopolist may use di¤erent
advertising content: no information, price information only, product characteristics,
or both price and product characteristics. Specically, if all consumers have the same
search cost, as the search cost grows the rm must include more information in the
advertising content, while as the network externality changes from negative to posi-
tive, the rm reduces the content. In contrast, if the search costs of consumers di¤er,
the rm tends to provide more information as the externality changes from negative
to positive.
The second chapter considers an advertising game in a market with network ex-
ternalities and consumers who cannot observe prices. Two oligopolists decide on their
advertising strategies in the beginning of the game and then compete in prices. Upon
observing the advertising decisions of rms, consumers search if needed. Negative
consumption externality lowers the minimum threshold level of search costs and in-
creases the prots of the advertising rm. Hence, at least one rm must advertise for
a snob e¤ect. Weak bandwagon e¤ect and snob e¤ect lead to equilibria with interior
solutions in which both rms have positive market shares. When consumption exter-
nality exceeds a degree of product di¤erentiation, the demand function of each rm
becomes upward-slopping. The externality dominates any strategic and price e¤ects
and therefore a higher price is necessarily associated with a greater market share.
Finally, the only equilibria with a strong bandwagon e¤ect are those when only one
rm supplies an entire market.
The third chapter is motivated by empirical studies on advertising outlays report-
ing that incumbent rms change their advertising strategies in response to a new entry.
While some incumbents reduce their advertising expenditures, others increase them
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in comparison to the pre-entry period. Existing literature on strategic advertising in
entry games is mostly focused on entry deterrence, no theoretical foundation is found
in this literature to explain what determines a change in the advertising strategies in
the case of entry accommodation. The third chapter considers four types of adver-
tising and builds a model that examines how accommodating incumbents decide on
advertising. The paper also provides results on how advertising is related to the size
of the entry. Particularly, informative advertising and advertising enhancing product
di¤erentiation allow greater entry, while complementary and business-stealing adver-
tising result in fewer entries, since they reduce residual demand for potential entrants.
Depending on whether post-entry competition variables are strategic substitutes or
strategic complements, incumbent rms may increase or reduce their advertising out-






    V této dizertaci studujeme z pohledu industriální organizace dvě témata z 
oblasti ekonomie reklamy. Ve své práci uvažujeme roli reklamy na trzích se síťovou 
externalitou ve spotřebě, a dále analyzuji reklamu jako odpověď úřadující firmy na vstup 
nového konkurenta na trh. 
    První článek se zabývá pobídkou monopolistické firmy, která vyrábí produkt, jenž 
vykazuje charakteristiky síťové externality, inzerovat reklamu v situaci, kdy spotřebitelé 
nemají úplné informace, což vede k hledání jejich rezervační ceny. Pokud uzná za 
vhodné, může firma pomocí reklamy odhalit určité tržní informace. Výsledky naznačují, 
že reklama je pravděpodobnější v situaci negativní síťové externality a méně 
pravděpodobná v situaci pozitivní síťové externality. Pokud monopolista čelí silné síťové 
externalitě, pak podporuje maximální možnou síť a požaduje cenu, která odpovídá 
hodnotě této externality.  Monopolista si může zvolit obsah své reklamy na základě typu 
síťové externality a nákladů spotřebitelů na hledání rezervační ceny. Obsah reklamy může 
obsahovat pouze informace o ceně produktu nebo pouze o vlastnostech produktu, nebo 
může obsahovat informace jak o ceně, tak o vlastnostech produktu. Firma si dále může 
zvolit takovou reklamu, která nebude poskytovat žádné výše zmíněné informace o 
produktu.  Konkrétně pokud mají všichni spotřebitelé stejné náklady na hledání 
rezervační ceny pak s růstem těchto nákladů, musí firma do reklamy zahrnout více 
informací. Pokud dojde ke změně síťové externality z negativní na pozitivní, pak firma 
sníží množství poskytovaných informací v reklamě. Pokud mají ovšem spotřebitelé různé 
náklady na hledání rezervační ceny, pak, při změně externality z negativní na pozitivní, 
má firma sklon publikovat reklamu, jež obsahuje více informací. 
Ve druhé kapitole se zaměřujeme na reklamní hru na trhu, v němž se vyskytuje síťová 
externalita a na němž spotřebitelé nemohou pozorovat ceny. Dva oligopolisté si na 
začátku této hry určí svou reklamní strategii a následně se dostávají do cenové 
konkurence. Poté co si obě firmy zvolí svou reklamní strategii, tak spotřebitelé mohou 
začít hledat dodatečné informace, pokud je potřebují. Negativní spotřební externalita vede 
ke snížení úrovně minimální hranice nákladů na hledání informací a zvyšuje zisky všem 
firmám inzerujícím reklamu. To znamená, že pro snobův efekt je zapotřebí, aby alespoň 
jedna firma inzerovala reklamu. Slabý bandwagon efekt a snobův efekt vedou 
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k rovnováze s vnitřním řešením, ve které mají obě firmy pozitivní tržní podíl. Když 
spotřební externalita překročí stupeň produktové diferenciace, pak se poptávková funkce 
změní v rostoucí funkci. V tomto případě externalita naprosto dominuje nad všemi 
strategiemi a cenami, což má za následek to, že vyšší ceny vedou k většímu tržnímu 
podílu. Pouze v situaci kdy celý trh zásobuje pouze jedna firma, je možné najít 
rovnováhy, ve kterých se objevuje silný  bandwagon efekt. 
Empirické studie zabývající se výdaji na reklamu ukazují, že firmy mění své reklamní 
strategie v závislosti na vstupu nové firmy do odvětví. Zatímco někteří incumbenti 
odpovídají na vstup nové firmy do odvětví snížením svých reklamních výdajů, jiní je 
naopak zvyšují. Stávající literatura zabývající se strategickou inzercí a reklamou v 
souvislosti se vstupem nové firmy do odvětví se většinou zaměřuje na znemožnění 
nového vstupu do odvětví. Ve stávajícím výzkumu ovšem doposud chybějí teoretické 
základy, které by pomohly vysvětlit, co ovlivňuje změnu reklamních strategií v situaci, 
kdy dojde k akomodaci nového vstupu. Ve své práci stavíme model, který zkoumá, jak se 
akomodující incumbenti rozhodují o reklamní strategii. Za tímto účelem uvažujeme čtyři 
typy reklamy. Ve svém článku také uvádíme, jak je reklamní strategie spojena s velikostí 
nově příchozích. Konkrétně říkáme, že informativní reklama a reklama zvýrazňující 
diferenciaci produktu umožňují větší počet vstupujících. Naproti tomu komplementární a 
business-stealing typy reklamy zmenšují zbylou poptávku pro potenciální nově vstupující, 
a tím vedou k menšímu počtu vstupů do odvětví. Incumbenti zvyšují, respektive snižují, 
reklamní výdaje v závislosti na tom, zda proměnné popisující konkurenci po vstupu jsou 
spíše strategické substituty nebo komplementy. 
 
Introduction
The economics of advertising is a branch of economic theory that considers four
main questions. Firstly, it studies the incentives for a rm to advertise. Clearly, most
rms spend a signicant share of their budget on advertising. There are economic
reasons for rms to advertise. Secondly, economics of advertising investigates how
rms decide what, how and how much to advertise. Specically, rms choose what
type/s of advertisements to use, what advertising content to include in the message
and determine an optimal volume of advertising (e.g., number of leaets sent, TV ads,
etc.). Thirdly, it studies the e¤ects of advertising on market performance. As eco-
nomic research shows, advertising a¤ects market power, competition and protability
in industries. Finally, it is also important to know how advertising inuences the
wellbeing of consumers and social welfare in general; whether advertising is socially
excessive or inadequate.
The economics of advertising began with Marshal (1890, 1919), however a signi-
cant interest to advertising has arised in the beginning of the XX century only. There
are three reasons advertising was not an important research question before that time.
Firstly, until the end of the XIX century, the economic thought was primarily based
on the neoclassical approach and the development of the theory of perfect compe-
tition. The latter does not suggest any reason for advertising at all, since under
competition and neoclassical assumptions no rm can obtain a higher price through
advertising, market information is complete and perfect, consumers are rational and
possess xed preferences. The second reason is that the beginning of the XX century
was a time of industrial progress, transition to mass production and signicant ad-
vances in transportation, communication and distribution. These economic conditions
explain economies of scale and a need for expansion of demand through advertising.
Moreover, this is exactly the time when the theory of imperfect competition became
a central question in economic research. The third reason is an overall change in
the society. Urbanization, income growth and more sophisticated consumer needs
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gave room for marketing and promotion of goods and services. All these explained
increased interest in advertising and the formation of advertising economics.
Recent research in the economics of advertising is closely related to industrial
economics and studies the e¤ects of advertising on market performance, market power,
entry and competition. It also uses advances in information economics, like search
models, signaling and disclosure games. Empirical analysis of advertising starts from
the 1950s and mainly deals with the measurement of the e¤ect of advertising on prot,
sales, and market entry and concentration.
This dissertation considers two topics in economics of advertising. The rst is the
informative role of advertising in markets with network externalities in consumption.
The second topic is how an accommodating incumbent reacts to a new market entry
in terms of advertising.
The rst part of the research describes markets where the consumers decision to
buy a good depends not only on actual physical characteristics but also how many
people buy the same good. In these markets, clientele size determines the magnitudes
of the network externality that may increase the valuation of the good if the network
e¤ect is positive, or decrease the valuation if the network e¤ect is negative. When
consumers face incomplete market information in such markets, they cannot correctly
calculate their willingness to pay for the good and thus economic ine¢ ciencies may
arise. One way to resolve the information problem is to introduce a search, i.e. when
consumers may incur some costs and thus gain access to the information they need.
The second way is provision of market information by the rm in the form of adver-
tising. This option may even be preferred by rms because the need to search usually
lowers demand and can even lead to zero sales in extreme cases such as the Diamond
paradox.
Chapter 1 considers the incentives of a monopolistic rm to advertise in a market
with network externalities where consumers cannot freely observe price and product
characteristics (the match of consumer tastes to a good). The rm can use four types
of advertising content: no information, price only, product characteristics or both
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price and product characteristics. The results show that, depending on the network
externality, the rm chooses di¤erent advertising strategies. When all consumers have
identical search costs, as network externality goes from positive to negative, the rm
tends to include more information in its advertising. The reason is that the expected
benet of a search is decreasing in the network e¤ect and thus consumers search less.
The only way to expand demand is to provide market information in the form of
advertising. However, if the search cost is low enough and the externality is positive,
the rm may even choose to not advertise at all. When search costs are heterogeneous
among consumers, the rm never remains silent, but must advertise at least its price
or matches. Moreover, the rm increases its advertising content as the externality goes
from negative to positive. The latter result di¤ers from the case with homogeneous
costs and crucially depends on the fact that the search decision is di¤erent for di¤erent
consumers. Specically, the expected benet of a search is not only conditional on the
network externality, but also whether a consumers search cost is low enough. Since
the consumers willingness to pay is increasing in the network externality, the rm
wants to support a larger clientele and thus it advertises more.
Chapter 2 continues the study of the market with network e¤ects, but considers a
strategic interaction between two oligopolists. In the rst stage of the game the rms
simultaneously decide whether or not to advertise their prices. In the second stage,
they set prices. Consumers observe the advertising decisions of the rms and make
their search and buying decisions based on the information they have. The full game
is a disclosure game in which rms make their advertising and pricing choices. Three
advertising outcomes are possible: both rms stay silent, only one rm advertises
its price or both rms advertise. Depending on the nature and magnitudes of the
network externality, di¤erent types of market equilibrium are possible. When the
network e¤ect is negative or weakly positive, both rms have positive market shares
and at least one rm should advertise in the presence of the negative externality. When
the market is characterized by a strong positive network e¤ect, either both rms stay
silent or both advertise. When the externality is positive and strong enough, the
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expected benet of a purchase is large enough to induce a search, so both rms may
stay silent. However when the externality becomes larger, the equilibrium in which
one rm captures a whole market dominates all other outcomes. In this case, the rm
advertises a price that is equal to the net value of the externality.
There are two important concluding remarks on Chapters 1 and 2. Firstly, in
contrast to the existing literature on network e¤ects, the present research assumes that
consumers cannot easily calculate their willingness to pay in markets with network
externalities, since market information may be incomplete. Therefore, search and
advertising are introduced to remedy the information problem. Secondly, advertising
decisions of rms and their choice of advertising content depend not only on search
costs, but also on the network externality. The results of Chapters 1 and 2 shed light
on how rms choose advertising strategies in the presence of network e¤ects.
Chapter 3 contains the second part of the research. It relates advertising to the
theory of market entry. The entry deterrence e¤ect of advertising is well studied in
the literature. Advertising creates brand loyalty, enhances the valuation of the goods
and product di¤erentiation, increases penetration costs for new rms and thus can
impede or even block new entries. Nevertheless, little has been done to explain the
role of advertising when incumbent rms do not block, but rather accommodate new
entry. Empirical works (e.g. Cubbin and Domberger, 1988) show that accommodating
incumbents do not only signicantly change their advertising outlays, but do it in a
di¤erent manner: some rms reduce advertising, other rms increase advertising.
Chapter 3 o¤ers a theoretical model that explains di¤erent advertising strategies of
an accommodating incumbent in the markets with di¤erentiated products.
Recent advertising literature points out three di¤erent kinds of advertising: per-
suasive, informative and complementary. Persuasive advertising creates brand loyalty,
enhances product di¤erentiation and shifts the preferences of consumers towards the
advertised good thereby increasing market power. Informative advertising transmits
market information like prices, product characteristics, existence and locations of
sellers. Complementary advertising is a good itself; it increases utility gain for the
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advertised good, since consumers possess preferences for complementary advertising
(advertising that enhances the image, brand or status of goods). Firms choose a
particular type of advertising depending on the good they produce and market char-
acteristics.
The results of the model in Chapter 3 show that, depending on the type of adver-
tising chosen and whether post-entry competition variables are strategic substitutes
or strategic complements, incumbent rms may increase or reduce their advertising
outlays in response to new entries. Additionally, the model also considers how ad-
vertising is related to the size of entry, and concludes that informative advertising
and advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation allow greater entry, while comple-
mentary and business-stealing advertising result in fewer entries, since they reduce
residual demand for potential entrants.
To sum up, this present dissertation contributes to the existing literature on the
economics of advertising by studying the informative role of advertising in markets




Informative Advertising in a Monopoly
with Network Externalities
1.1 Introduction
In some markets, the individual buying decision of a consumer may depend on
the number of other consumers who own or buy the same good. In particular, the
telecommunication, luxury products, books, gyms, swimming pools, software and
fashion. Markets are characterized by strong network e¤ects (also known as network
externalities). These externalities may be positive or negative depending on how
they a¤ect consumerswillingness to pay. A network externality is positive when
a consumers utility increases with the number of consumers using the same good,
i.e. consumers benet from the greater clientele. One can observe this e¤ect in,
among others, the software, books, fashion, music markets. When the network e¤ect
is negative, a consumers willingness to pay is decreasing in the number of consumers
who buy the same good. No one likes overcrowded beaches or swimming pools, and
some people who desire uniqueness and exclusivity enjoy goods with limited editions
such as status and luxury goods.
Network e¤ects are divided into two groups depending on the origin of the e¤ect.
The rst group is technology side network e¤ects, which are explained by the supply
side of the market, specically originating from technology, and include telecommuni-
cation, software, and hardware. They are characterized by a positive externality and
the most important research questions are technology adoption and compatibility
problems of competing brands. The second group is demand side e¤ects (or network
externalities in consumption), which usually originate from consumer preferences for
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social-economic attributes of goods found in the markets of status goods, fashion,
music, books, and subcultures. In the economic literature, a positive consumption
e¤ect is called conformity or bandwagon e¤ect and a negative consumption external-
ity is called vanity, snob e¤ect or snobbism. The body of the literature on network
externalities in consumption is small and mainly represented by signalling models and
taxation of positional goods.
The research goal of this paper is to combine network externalities and a disclosure
game to study the incentives of a monopoly to reveal any market information. In
markets with network externalities, consumers make their buying decision before they
realize the actual volumes of sales, and therefore they must form expectations based
on the available market information. However, this information is not easy to obtain
and therefore rms may disclose it themselves (at least partly) if needed. Surprisingly,
related studies have not yet considered the problem of information frictions in these
markets. While in many markets with network externalities, rms usually at least
partly disclose some information. For example, producers of luxury products (cars,
jewellery, watches, etc.) announce exact quantities of the good (as limited edition).
Samsung and Apple advertise both prices and physical characteristics of their new
products. Therefore, it is of a practical interest to study how sellers of products with
network externalities decide whether to disclose any information and what content to
include in the advertising message.
Literature on the e¤ects of consumption network externalities on market function-
ing consists of several articles considering an oligopolistic setting where consumers
rationally anticipate a market outcome with fullled expectations (Navon et al., 1995;
Grilo et al , 2001; Griva and Vettas, 2001). Specically, these studies assume that
consumers are rational, perfectly informed, aware of market prices, and able to foresee
the actual clientele size. Moreover, they do not consider any commitment problems
related to prices. In reality, consumers face imperfect information, limited abilities to
rationally foresee the market outcome and they may not also easily observe prices if
rms have not advertised them. In this case consumers cannot correctly form their
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expectations about clientele sizes and realize their actual willingness to pay for a good.
For this reason, many producers of goods with network e¤ects deliver some market
information in the form of price advertising, announcement of total supply or product
characteristics. This information is used by consumers to correctly foresee the market
outcome. Additionally, advertising also works as a commitment device to ensure that
rms adhere to their publicly announced prices or output.
Advertising is widely used in search models as a means of information disclosure.
When consumers are ex ante poorly informed about charged prices or valuations for
the good (product characteristics), they may search and learn necessary information
by incurring some time or monetary costs. Otherwise, rms may disclose this informa-
tion themselves in the form of advertising. In the latter case, all disclosed information
becomes public knowledge, and as a result consumers are able to optimally make their
buying decisions.
This chapter considers a model in which consumers are prone to consumption
externalities but face a need to search because of incomplete information. Specically,
consumers are assumed to be ex ante unaware of prices and their actual valuation for
the good. There are two ways to obtain necessary information: a costly search by
consumers or advertising by rm. If consumers need to search, they compare their
expected benets of a purchase with the cost of the search that is assumed to be
either homogeneous or heterogenous. If the monopolist advertises, it chooses how
much information to disclose. The model considered in this paper serves to explain
how consumers decide on a search, what price internalizes a consumption externality
and what conditions inuence the choice of the advertising content. In particular,
the central research question is how the network externality a¤ects the information
disclosure decision of the rm.
The results suggest that when search cost is homogeneous, the rm needs to ad-
vertise for a negative network e¤ect since the expected benets of search decrease in
the externality and thus consumers search less. As the network externality moves
from negative to positive, the rm reduces the advertised content if search costs are
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not large. When search cost is heterogenous, the rm advertises less information for a
negative network e¤ect and advertises more for a positive network e¤ect. This occurs
due to a more sensitive demand, since the probability of buying does not only depend
on the consumers match alone but also if her search cost is low enough. Moreover, for
a negative network e¤ect all consumers prefer a small clientele, and therefore providing
little information reduces visits and thus restricts demand. Conversely, for a positive
network e¤ect all consumers benet from a larger clientele, and thus providing more
information increases visits and expands demand.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 is a review of the related literature.
Section 1.3 describes the search decision of consumers, price-settings of the rm and
an advertising game. Section 1.4 presents results and concluding remarks.
1.2 Literature Review
There are three groups of literature closely related to this study. The rst is a set
of papers devoted to the social attributes of consumption. Network externalities in
consumption was initially discussed by Veblen (1899) and then formalized by Leiben-
stein (1950) who coined the terms bandwagon e¤ect, snob e¤ect and Veblen e¤ect1.
These e¤ects are the key terms used in studies associated with consumption exter-
nalities. Further literature on the topic is a set of signalling models2 and a theory
of conformity3 explaining behavioral reasons as to why individuals are sensitive to a
bandwagon or snobbism.
The second group of literature is related to network economics. A detailed review
1Veblen e¤ect describes a situation in which demand positively reacts to a higher price of the good.
Buying an expensive good (usually status goods or positional goods) shows a high social-economic
status of the buyer. A higher price of a Veblen good serves as a signal of the status. It is important to
distinguish between snob e¤ect and Veblen e¤ect. Snob e¤ect is a demand-reducing e¤ect associated
with the total clientele size. With snob e¤ect price is not importnat. Consumers only care how
many other individuals own the same good. Snob e¤ect can only decrease price elasticity but cannot
contradict the law of demand. Veblen e¤ect, in turn, changes the direction of the price e¤ect from
negative to positive.
2For instance, Bagwell & Bernheim (1996) and Corneo & Jeanne (1997) assume that buying a
conspicuous good signals the social-economic status of consumers.
3Bernheim (1994) explains why people with heterogeneous preferences over behavioral patterns
sometimes conform to a single conduct.
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of network economics is found in Shy (2011), the author determines a network e¤ect
as a special kind of externality when consumers utility or rms prots are directly
or indirectly a¤ected by the number of adopters of the same buying decision or tech-
nology. Economides and Himmelberg (1995) analyze the equilibrium size of networks
under di¤erent market structures and conclude that monopoly provides the small-
est network, prefect competition results in the largest network, and oligopoly has a
moderate network. Navon et al. (1995), Grilo et al. (2001), and Vettas and Griva
(2011) study network externalities in oligopoly with product di¤erentiation. These
papers conclude that a negative network e¤ect softens price competition, while a pos-
itive network e¤ect leads to lower prices and stronger competition. Moreover, with a
strong bandwagon e¤ect a rm with a locational advantage may even capture a whole
market. These studies shed light on how consumption externalities inuence price
competition in oligopoly. The core limitation of the studies is an assumption that
consumers are able to perfectly foresee the market outcome, i.e. the authors consider
equilibria with fullled expectations. This assumption has to be relaxed because in
reality consumers face bounded rationality and incomplete information. Nevertheless,
research in network economics has contributed to the building of bridges between the
technological nature of networks and behavioral aspects of consumption.
The third group of related literature is devoted to search theory. This theory
implies that with incomplete market information consumers need to incur some costs
(e.g. time, e¤ort, money) to obtain necessary information. In other words, they are
engaged in a costly search. This market friction complicates a buying decision and
reduces demand for rms. Anderson and Renault (2006) show that by advertising
relevant information such as prices and valuations for the good, a rm can secure
prots in the presence of search costs. Konishi and Sandfort (2002) consider an
advertising game in monopoly and duopoly. In their paper, price advertising expands
rmsdemand and therefore rms may nd it protable to incur advertising costs in
order to increase revenues. Depending on the values of advertising and search costs,
rms choose between staying silent and advertising.
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This chapter studies how the network externalities in consumption inuence the
advertising decision of a monopolist if consumers face a problem of incomplete infor-
mation. Section 3 presents a model in which a monopolist decides whether to disclose
any market information or make consumers search for this information themselves.
1.3 Model
This section presents a monopoly model of advertising in a market of a good
with network e¤ects when consumers are not able to correctly form their expectations
about the potential clientele size, because they are poorly informed. Consumers may
learn market information by searching or through the rms advertising. If consumers
search, they incur some search cost which is simply a cost of visiting the store. Oth-
erwise, a monopolist may disclose some market information using advertising. Once
consumers have learnt the information they are able to correctly anticipate future
sales, form their willingness to pay and, make a buying decision. In this sense, the
good is a search good4.
A continuum of consumers is independently and uniformly distributed on a unit
interval [0,1]. Each consumer has a valuation for the commodity  which belongs to
this interval. However, consumers have ex ante identical tastes, because in the begin-
ning they are not informed about how much they value the product of the monopolist
(e.g., they do not know product characteristics, their matches to the product). To
learn both  and a price, each consumer needs to visit the store and pay a search cost
c. Search cost is public knowledge.
Every consumer has a utility function U =  + de   p; where p stands for the
market price and de is the expected clientele size (future sales)5. The measure of the
4Nelson (1970, 1974) introduces two types of market goods: search goods and experience goods.
A search good is a good with easily veried consumption characteristics, consumers are able to realize
their willingness to pay (utility gain) after a search (a visit to the store) but before the purchase.
With an experience good consumers can realize their actual utility gain only upon consumption,
because product characteristics cannot be observed in advance.
5As discussed before, when consumers decide to buy a conspicuous good (or any good with a
network e¤ect), they base their decision on how many other consumers will own this good. Therefore,
their willingness to pay is dependent on the clientele size (actual sales). If the price of this good is
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network externality is reected by : If  > 0; there is a bandwagon e¤ect (a positive
network e¤ect) and if  < 0; there is a snob e¤ect (a negative network e¤ect). Without
perfect information about market price and , the consumer is not able to correctly
foresee de and consequently she cannot realize her actual benets of the purchase.
Amonopolistic rm produces a good at zero marginal cost, decides on the price and
whether it wants to disclose any information with advertising. Advertising is costless.
The model also assumes "truth-in-advertising law", whereby it is illegal to announce
false information. A monopolist commits to its announcements with advertising. The
game considered in this model has the following timing:
1. In the beginning of the game, the rm decides whether to advertise or not.
Consumers do not know their valuations and the market price.
Case A: There is no advertising.
Case B: Only the price is advertised.
Case C: Only horizontal matches  are advertised.
Case D: Both the price and  are advertised. Consumers have no information
problem but still need to pay c as a visiting cost.
2. Observing the advertising decision of the rm, consumers choose whether to
search or not. If a consumer searches, she incurs a search cost c:
3. If there was no advertising, each consumer who decides to search realizes her
match  which is randomly drawn from the interval [0,1]
4. Once consumers have learnt both  and the price, they make their buying
decision.
In this section, two types of search costs are considered. The rst case deals with
a homogenous search cost, i.e. when all consumers have the same search cost c: In
the second case, it is assumed that consumers are heterogenous in search costs and
each consumer i has her own ci: This search cost does not depend on i:
public knowledge, everyone is able to correctly anticipate actual sales. However, in reality due to
bounded rationality and imperfect market information, consumers are not able to perfectly foresee
this and thus must spend some time, e¤ort, and money to x the problem. This situation can be,
for instance, resolved with a search.
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1.3.1 No advertising
Let us start with the problem of a representative consumer who observes no ad-
vertising from the rm. In this case she does not know her  and the charged price,
and thus she must search incurring some sunk visit cost c: A consumer i will buy the
good if her surplus is not negative: i + de   p > 0; which means that the share of
consumers with non-negative surplus is (1  b), with b = p  de:
The rm cannot inuence the search decision of consumers without advertising
and thus takes the number of searching consumers as given6. Let us denote the share
of searching consumers as s: In this case, the prot function of the monopolist is as
follows:
n(pn) = pn s (1  pn + de)




expected, this price increases in : If there is a bandwagon e¤ect, a greater clientele
size increases the consumers valuation for the product and thus increases the price.
In contrast, with a snob e¤ect, product valuation decreases with a larger volume of
sales and thus it reduces the price.
Consumers anticipate this price and decide to search only if their benets of the
search exceed the search cost c: The expected benet of a visit is the expected con-





e   p) d > c
This search rule implies that a consumer decides to visit the store if the expected
benets of search E(CS) > c; and remains inactive otherwise7.
6Since a rm cannot inuence the number of consumers who search, it also cannot inuence the
expectations of consumers, i.e. de:
7When the expected benets of a search are equal to the visiting cost, E(CS) = c, two types
of equilibrium may exist: full participation in which all consumers decide to search, and partial
participation in which consumers randomize between visiting and being inactive.
To avoid randomization, it is assumed that consumers prefer buying to having nothing and there-
fore they decide to search in any case. This assumption applies to the rest of the paper as well. An
equilibrium with partial participation is considered in Appendix 1A.
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When consumers visit the store, they learn all information and thus in equilibrium
a market clearance condition must satisfy: de = s(1 p+de): In other words, rational
consumers must foresee that their expectations about actual sales de are exactly what
is produced by the rm. In turn, this means that de = s(1 p)
1 s : If we solve this condition
for the monopoly price pn =
1+de
2
; then de = s
2 s and
b = 1 s
2 s : The corresponding
monopoly price is therefore pn = 12 s :
















If a visiting cost is the same for everyone, then the search condition is identical
for each consumer and the search decisions of all consumers coincide. This implies
that a share of consumers who decide to visit, s; is either 1 or 0. If s = 0, no one is
active and there is no market. If s = 1, then everyone searches and the corresponding







It is important to note that two di¤erent equilibria are possible, depending on the
value of : In particular, the equilibrium described above is only possible for  < 1.
However, with a strong bandwagon e¤ect  > 1; the equilibrium demand function
de = (1 p)
1  is upward slopping and thus the pricing rule changes. Let us start with the
case in which  < 1:
The corresponding search condition is described by the following inequality:
E(CS) =
1
2(2  )2 > c
Let us denote the threshold cost where this condition holds as a strict equality as
ec: If we investigate how this threshold cost changes with the measure of the externality
; we will obtain the following result:
dec
d
= (2  ) 3 > 0
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This shows that as  grows, the threshold search cost increases as depicted in
Figure 1 and implies that the set of search costs for which consumers decide to search
expands with : In other words, consumers are more likely to search for a positive 
and more likely to stay inactive for a negative : This conclusion is summarized in
Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If a monopolist does not advertise prices and  < 1; consumers tend
to search more for a product with a bandwagon e¤ect and tend to search less for a
product with a snob e¤ect. This implies that advertising is more e¤ective in the case
of a snob e¤ect.
With a bandwagon e¤ect (i.e. a positive network e¤ect) greater  increases the
expected consumer surplus, which in turn increases search intensity. With a snob
e¤ect (i.e. a negative network e¤ect) greater expected sales reduce consumer surplus
and thus the benets of a search decrease.
The second option is that consumer preferences are characterized by a strong
positive consumption externality,  > 1: In this setting, the equilibrium demand
function increases in price de = (1 p)
1  and due to this functional form higher sales of
the monopolist are always associated with a higher price. When there is a strong
positive network e¤ect, it can dominate the negative e¤ect of price on demand8 and
thus the only way the rmmay have a positive market share is to charge a higher price.
The only equilibrium compatible in this setting is when everyone searches, everybody
buys, and the monopolist charges the maximum possible price that supports this
equilibrium. This price can be found from two conditions: de = (1 p)
1  and d
e = 1:
Thus, the only price that satises the conditions is p = : Consumers rationally
anticipate this price and compute their expected surplus as:
8Appendix 1B presents a detailed explanation on how equilibrium demand with fullled expec-
tations is formed for network goods. The appendix also provides an intuition why demand curve is
upward slopping for a strong bandwagon e¤ect.
15




(i +    ) d =
1
2
Therefore, consumers search for c < 1
2
and the resulting price is equal to . The
corresponding prot is also 
Lemma 2. If a monopolist does not advertise and  > 1, the only equilibrium
is when everyone searches, the monopolist serves all consumers and charges a price
equal to the value of the network externality :
This result is intuitive: when the network e¤ect is strong, the utility gain of
consumers approaches its maximum at any price p < ; since everyone is willing to
buy the good. Thus, the monopolist charges the highest possible price that induces
the full participation of consumers. In this case, both price and prot increase in the
network e¤ect: greater  allows the monopolist to charge a higher price and obtain a
higher prot.
To sum up, the rm can remain silent with a homogenous search cost in two cases:
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when  < 1 and c 6 1




2  share of consumers; when
 > 1 and c < 1
2
the rm charges pn =  selling to everyone. Otherwise, there is no
market because no one searches. Therefore, the only way to make consumers visit the
store is to provide information in the form of advertising.
Heterogenous visiting costs
The case with heterogenous search costs means that the costs are di¤erent for
every consumer. This di¤erence may be explained by di¤erent abilities for a search, a
di¤erent distance to the store, or a di¤erent value of time, etc. However, the key issue
is that consumers do not have the same search costs. This implies that the share of
visiting consumers s can take any value from 0 to 1.
Let us assume that each consumer i has a visit cost ci which is uniformly distributed
on [0,1] and is independent of : The problem of the rm is the same as before and















A consumer who decides to search must have a search cost no larger than 1
2(2 s)2 ;
and given the uniform distribution of the visiting costs, s = 1
2(2 s)2
9. This condition
can be transformed into an implicit function F (s; y) = 0 which indirectly expresses
s via : It is of interest to see how the share of searching consumers depends on the







(2  s)3   
s
Figure 2 shows that the share of searching consumers is higher for a bandwagon
e¤ect and lower for a snob e¤ect even with heterogenous search costs. The same
explanation as before is applicable to this result: a greater clientele size increases
consumer surplus for a positive network e¤ect and decreases the surplus for a negative
9Indeed, since ci is uniformly distributed on [0,1], a share of consumers with ci < 12(2 s)2 is a
share of 12(2 s)2 : These are the consumers who decide to search, i.e. s:
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e¤ect. This inuences the search decision of consumers and, correspondingly, the
advertising policy of the rm which is reected in Lemma 1.
When the monopolist does not advertise and consumers have heterogenous search






(2 s)2 : As one can see, heterogenous search costs bring lower price, sales, and
prot in comparison with the homogenous costs case, because heterogenous costs re-
duce the share of potential buyers even more. Figure 3 shows the curves of equilibrium
s; d; p in the space of  (horizontal axis). All three increase in the externality. Larger
 enhances the expected consumer surplus and thus stimulates a search and sales, and
increases price.
As in the previous case, two options are possible: s < 1 and s > 1: By the same
reasoning, if the network e¤ect is high enough, there can be an equilibrium when a





(i +    p) d =
1
2
+    p > 1
This suggests a price p =   1
2
that supports an equilibrium with full participation.
However, this equilibrium is only possible with a very large positive .
To summarize the results of the case when the monopolist does not advertise any
information, let us state the proposition that follows:
Proposition 1. When a monopoly provides no information about its price and
consumersmatches, the likelihood of a visit increases in the bandwagon e¤ect and
decreases in the snob e¤ect. Heterogeneous visiting cost has lower equilibrium sales
and price compared to the case when the cost is homogeneous. A di¤erence in the
visiting costs of consumers reduces the search benet even more and thus consumers
tend to search less.
10Note that since ci 2 [0; 1]; a consumer with the maximum search cost searches only if the expected
surplus exceeds 1.
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Figure 2: Share of searching consumers, s
Figure 3: Equilibrium s; d; p when nothing is advertised
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1.3.2 Price advertising only
Homogeneous visiting costs
Let us suppose that, at the rst stage of the game, the monopolist decides to an-
nounce its price. This situation takes place when the search cost exceeds the thresh-
old value ec and thus there will be no market for the good without advertising. The
rm must advertise at least its price to reassure consumers that visiting the store is
worthwhile. By disclosing its price alone, the rm can internalize the consumption ex-
ternality, but consumers still need to search because they do not know their horizontal
matches, i.e. :
As in Anderson and Renault (2006), the rm advertises a price that renders ex-
pected an consumer surplus net of search cost zero. This means that, with homoge-
neous visiting costs, the advertised price is a critical price at which all consumers are
indi¤erent between searching and being inactive. If the monopolist advertises some










Given de = 1 p




2c(1  ) > 0 and sells to
p













: It is interesting to note that actual sales do not depend
on the network e¤ect. When the rm advertises its price only, it chooses a target
clientele size irrespective of the consumption externality and charges a price that
captures the whole expected consumer surplus. When price is advertised alone, the
rm can fully internalize the consumption externality with the announced price only.
Since consumers still need to search to realize their matches, their visiting decision
crucially depends on the value of c. Consequently, the equilibrium demand depends
on the visit cost c only.
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Lemma 3. If a monopolist decides to advertise its price only, then the advertised
price is p = 1 
p
2c(1 ) and the share of served consumers is
p
2c: This equilibrium





The equilibrium price decreases in the search cost for a snob e¤ect and a weak
bandwagon,  < 1. This result is parallel to that in Anderson and Renault (2006) in
which a larger search cost makes the rm advertise a lower price to attract consumers.
However, when bandwagon is strong ( > 1); the price increases in c. This can
be explained by the unusual functional form of the demand function with a strong
bandwagon e¤ect. When  > 1, demand function increases in price and thus a larger
market share is always associated with a higher price. Actual sales of the monopolist
equal
p
2c and thus a higher search cost raises the equilibrium price for a strong
positive network e¤ect. In addition, if c > 1
2
; the monopolist needs to sell to the
whole market, which implies that the advertised price is the price that induces full
participation, p = : In contrast, in the previous case with no advertising, it was
shown that an equilibrium with full participation of consumers is possible only if
c < 1
2
: Therefore, price only advertising cannot have a fully covered market.
Heterogenous visiting costs
When visiting costs di¤er across consumers, the expected benet of the purchase
shows a fraction of consumers for whom visiting costs are lower than their expected




When the rm advertises its price, it can inuence the search decision of consumers
with the announced price and thus its prot function is as follows:
p = p s (1  p+ de) = p(1  p+ d
e)2
2
(1  p+ de) = p(1  p+ d
e)3
2
Both fullled expectations and market clearing conditions imply that consumers





Figure 4: Equilibrium s; d; p when price is advertised only
tion is an implicit equilibrium demand function.
The rm chooses to announce the price that maximizes its prot. FOC with
respect to price is:
pp =
3(1  p+ de)2




The corresponding equilibrium is dened by the system of three equations which
implicitly express market price p, share of visiting consumers s; and equilibrium vol-













The corresponding curves of equilibrium s; d; p are shown in Figure 4. The hor-
izontal axis is a space of : Both sales and the share of visiting consumers increases
in  as expected; while price decreases in the externality. When the rm advertises
its price, it can inuence the expectations of consumers and thus it uses a price an-
nouncement to support a particular expectation about the clientele size. Specically,
if  is negative, the rm must set a su¢ ciently high price to have a small clientele
since a smaller clientele implies a higher valuation for the good. However, when 
approaches the bandwagon e¤ect, the rm must charge a low price to attract more
consumers since a higher clientele enhances consumerswillingness to pay. The rm
can use this price advertising only for  < 0:36 (a condition on positive values of s; d
and p):
Proposition 2. If a monopolist advertises its price alone and does not provide
any match information, then with a homogeneous visiting cost it chooses a xed target
volume of sales and internalizes the network externality with price only. This price
increases in the network e¤ect. In contrast, with a heterogeneous visiting cost both
sales and the share of visiting consumers increase in the network e¤ect while price
positively reacts to the externality. The rm commits to its price with advertising and
thus it can positively a¤ect consumersexpectations with a higher price and negatively
a¤ect their expectations with a lower price.
1.3.3 Match advertising only
Homogeneous visiting costs
Parameter  indicates a valuation for the good. Specically, it shows how much
a consumer values products functionality, practical characteristics and physical at-
tributes (e.g. taste, color, shape, material, design, etc.). Consumers are heterogeneous
in how they value these attributes. However, before consumers visit the shop, they
dont know these characteristics. Consumers must visit the store and inspect the good
to realize their match: how well the products characteristics suit the preferences
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of a given consumer. Since consumers have di¤erent preferences over these attributes
they may value the good di¤erently.
Advertising of  is thus a disclosure of product characteristics: materials used in
production, taste, design, size, color, etc. This information helps consumers to form
a more correct willingness to pay for a good with network externalities.
When the monopolist advertises only , consumers learn their matches (which
di¤er across consumers). This type of advertising leads to a hold-up problem and
consequently to the Diamond paradox where no one wants to visit the store. Thus, a
monopolist never advertises  only.
To explain why consumers never visit the store when they are informed only about
their valuations for the good, let us consider the reasoning as follows. When consumers
know their  and no price is advertised, they rationally expect some realization of the
price p charged by the rm and the associated sales de. If any consumer visits the
rm, then this consumer has a willingness to pay that exceeds the sum of the price
and the consumers search cost:  + de > p + c. Although the rm takes it into
account, it cannot inuence the expectations of the consumer de with price (it simply
cannot commit to price) and therefore tends to increase the price until the consumers
surplus is fully taken by the rm. This reasoning leads to the Diamond paradox, in
which no price exists below the upper price limit and thus there will be no visits of
consumers. This result is similar to that in Anderson and Renault (2006).
Heterogeneous visiting costs
The introduction of heterogeneous costs allows us to avoid the Diamond paradox.
As discussed in Anderson and Renault (2006), with heterogenous search costs equilib-
rium prices may be less than the monopoly price and tend smoothly toward marginal
cost as the search cost distribution puts more weight in the neighborhood of zero.
When the rm discloses horizontal matches to consumers, a particular consumer
i expects some price p and visits the store if her i > p + ci   de. Therefore, the
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(1  p  c+ de) dc = 1
2
  p+ de
Since the rm advertises matches only, it cannot inuence the expectations of
consumers with its price, hence de is taken by the rm as given. The corresponding










Consumers rationally anticipate this price and, given that consumersexpectations are
fullled in equilibrium, the rms sales are d = 1
2(2 ) : The corresponding equilibrium
price is p = 1
2(2 ) and 
m = 1
4(2 )2 . Match advertising is only possible for  < 1:5,
since d 2 (0; 1):
Both price and sales increase in the consumption externality : Derivatives of both




2(2 )2 > 0: Larger  enhances consumersvaluation for the
good and therefore increases both sales and the price.
Proposition 3. A monopolist can use match advertising only if visiting costs are
heterogeneous due to the Diamond paradox. Consumers learn their horizontal matches
and thus di¤erent types of consumers have di¤erent searching rules: higher  has a
greater share of visits. Both demand and price increase in the network e¤ect, since
the externality positively a¤ects the expected benet of a purchase.
1.3.4 Full disclosure
Homogeneous visiting costs
Let us suppose that the monopolist at the rst stage of the game decides to
reveal both  and the price. By disclosing them, the rm can fully internalize the
consumption externality and consumers can correctly form their expectations. With
this advertising all information is public, so consumers do not search but still need to
pay visiting costs. A consumer is willing to buy if her  > p+c d(p): In equilibrium
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actual sales must be equal to the production of the rm: d(p) = 1 + d(p)   p   c.
This gives a demand function d(p) = 1 p c
1  :
As before, two cases are possible:  < 1 and  > 1: In the latter case, the demand
function increase in price and thus the pricing rule of the rm di¤ers. Let us start
with the case when  < 1:










As one can see, the rm can charge the monopoly price pa = 1 c2 to a greater
share of the market11. This implies that with full disclosure the rm can internalize
the consumption externality and charge the monopoly price. Specically, this price
is independent of ; which in turn allows the rm to charge a high price even in the
presence of the negative network e¤ect12. This result supports Lemma 1, in which a
monopolist would prefer to advertise in the case of negative :With full disclosure the
rm can perfectly inuence the expectations of consumers and consequently the search
decision. Therefore, it can internalize the externality with the volume of equilibrium
sales while charging a regular monopoly price.
It is important to note that the equilibrium described above is only possible for
 6 1+c
2






the monopolist obtains all consumers at the
price equal to 1 c
2
: In turn, this means that the rm can charge p =    c and still
sell to all consumers. Larger  benets the rm because it can charge a higher price
and consequently receive greater prots.
When  > 1; a positive consumption externality compensates the negative e¤ect
of price and thus the demand function positively reacts to the price increase: d(p) =
11A regular monopoly without the network e¤ect would charge pm = argmax
p
[p(1  p  c)] = 1 c2
and sell the good to 1 c2 share of the market.
12Without advertising, the price was pn = 12  ; with advertising, it is pa =
1 c
2 ; which is larger
for  < 2cc 1 < 0:
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1 p c
1  . As in the previous case, the only equilibrium that survives is the one where
the rm sells to everyone and charges a price equal to the size of the network e¤ect
net of c: p =  c: Using the same reasoning as before, with a very strong bandwagon
e¤ect, the demand function positively depends on price and thus the rm is willing
to sell to all consumers. The maximum possible price that supports full participation
of consumers is found from: d(p) = 1 p c
1  = 1: It is equal to p =    c and the
corresponding prot is a =    c:
Lemma 4. If a monopolist chooses to advertise both price and , then for a
product with a snob e¤ect or a weak bandwagon e¤ect ( < 1+c
2
), a regular monopoly
price is charged pm = 1 c
2
that does not depend on : In the case of a strong bandwagon
e¤ect with  > 1+c
2
; a monopolist sells to all consumers and charges a price equal to
the size of the consumption externality net of c, p =    c:
Heterogeneous visiting costs
When both price and matches are public information, each consumer i observes
the advertised price p and visits the store if her i > p + ci   de. Moreover, since
the rm advertises its price it can perfectly inuence the expectations of consumers,
and consumers use the advertised price to calculate the actual sales. Therefore, the










Rearranging the terms brings d = 1 2p
2(1 ) and the resulting prot function is 
b =
p(1 2p)
2(1 ) . FOC with respect to price gives p =
1
4
and d = 1
4(1 ) : As in the case with
homogeneous visiting costs, the equilibrium price does not depend on : Moreover,
this price is a regular monopoly price (in the model with heterogenous visiting costs).
Thus, the rm can charge a monopoly price to a greater share of the market while
sales are adjusted to the consumption externality. This implies that when the rm
advertises both matches and price, it internalizes the externality by means of sales
27
only. This equilibrium exists for 1
4(1 ) 6 1 (or  6 0:75):
When  exceeds 1, the rm faces a strong bandwagon e¤ect and the only equilib-
rium is where the rm sells to everyone. The lowest type consumer receives a surplus
CS = 0   p +    1 and thus the price supporting the equilibrium with a corner
solution is p =    1.
Proposition 4. When a monopoly fully discloses market information, it commits
to its announced price and all consumers realize their matches. Therefore, the share
of visiting consumers is equal to the actual volume of sales. The rm is able to set
a monopoly price and fully internalizes the network externality with its output only.
When the rm faces a strong bandwagon e¤ect, it serves all consumers and charges a
price equal to the value of the externality net of the maximum visiting cost.
To sum up, we have considered four strategies of the rm. In the rst scenario, the
rm stays silent and does not advertise any information, and thus consumers must
search to obtain necessary market information. In the second case, the rm advertises
its price only. The third scenario is never used because the advertising of  only leads
to the Diamond paradox and zero sales if search costs are homogeneous. Finally, the
rm may disclose full information and thus consumers make their buying decisions




Let us now consider the very beginning of the game when the monopolist chooses
whether it is benecial to advertise and which information to disclose. To know
whether it is benecial, the rm should compare its prots: n,  and a: If a
monopolist does not advertise, only two equilibria exist: either when  < 1 and
c 6 1




2  share of consumers; or when  > 1
and c < 1
2
; the rm charges pn =  selling to everyone. If a monopolist decides to
advertise price only, the equilibrium price is p = 1 
p
2c(1  ) and sales are
p
2c.




2c(1  ) > 0. Only  advertising is never
chosen because of the Diamond paradox. Finally, if a rm chooses to advertise both
price and , then for  < 1+c
2
, a regular monopoly price pm = 1 c
2
is charged to 1 c
2(1 )
share of consumers, and for  > 1+c
2
; the rm sells to all consumers and charges a
price p =    c:
Depending on the values of  and c the rm chooses under which conditions a
particular advertising brings higher prots (or any positive prot if staying silent
means no market). In particular, we are interested in nding the regions where the
rm considers information disclosure a dominant strategy. In other words, the goal is
to determine where or a exceed n:










and 1: First, only
price advertising may exist only for 1  
p





: Second, the rm can stay silent only if c 6 1









]: Third, with advertising of both price and , the rm changes
its pricing policy at  > 1+c
2
: Fourth, without advertising the rm faces a strong
network e¤ect at  > 1 and thus also changes its pricing policy13. At the same





































2c > 1; a threshold value of  = 2+
q
1
2c does not have any specic meaning in the
analysis.
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possible locations of threshold  dene three regions in the space of the search cost c:











search costs with c > 1
2
: Let us investigate each case separately.
a) Low search costs




. There are ve regions in -space
as it is depicted in Figure 5:




; the rm must advertise both price and  because without
this advertising a search cost exceeds the expected consumer surplus and consumers
do not visit the store at all. The only way to make it work is to advertise a price
pm = 1 c
2
and sell to 1 c
2(1 ) share of consumers. Since
1
2(1 ) < 1; some consumers do
not buy and the market is uncovered14;








], the rm needs to advertise to make consumers visit
the store. It may use only price advertising if  > a or disclose full information if
a > ;






); the rm can choose between advertising or not. It
compares n; ; a and chooses a strategy that brings higher payo¤s;
- when 1+c
2
6  < 1; the rm also faces a choice whether to advertise or stay silent.
However, only price advertising is always dominated by staying silent in this region,
and thus it is never used. If the rm does not advertise, it obtains n = 1
(2 )2 : If the
rm advertises both price and , it faces a strong positive network e¤ect, and thus it
charges p =    c, sells to all consumers, and receives a =    c;
- when  > 1; the rm faces a strong positive network e¤ect. Since  <   c < 
, the rm chooses not to advertise at all. It charges a price equal to , consumers
expect this price, and all choose to search since search costs are low15.
b) Moderate search costs






]: There are ve regions in
14If some consumers are not served in equilibrium, the market is uncovered. If all consumers
participate and buy, the market is fully covered.
15Note that when  > 1, without advertising consumers search if c 6 12 :
30




-space as depicted in Figure 6:




; the rm needs to advertise both price and : The advertised
price is pm = 1 c
2
and sales are 1 c
2(1 ) . A search is not a¤ordable;






); the rm also needs to advertise, but in this region only
price advertising is also possible, and thus the rm compares advertising payo¤s and
chooses the best advertising option;






), only price advertising brings higher prots than full
information disclosure. Therefore, the rm advertises its price only;




; 1); the rm prefers to stay silent because search is possible
and both types of advertising result in lower prots: n >  >    c. Since  < 1
the market is uncovered;
- when  > 1; the rm faces a strong positive network e¤ect. Since search is
possible and n exceeds both  and    c, the rm chooses not to advertise at all
and charges p = . Consumers expect this price and choose to search because search
costs are low enough. Since  > 1; the market is fully covered.
Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate that a negative network e¤ect makes the rm provide
as much information as possible (advertising of both  and price). Meanwhile, a strong
positive externality brings higher prots when the rm is silent because the expected
benet of a search is positively related to the network externality. A negative network
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6 c 6 1
2
e¤ect decreases the expected consumer surplus and thus consumers search less. The
only way to make consumers visit the store is to provide necessary information in the
form of advertising. As Anderson and Renault (2006) and Renault (2016) show, price
is never advertised alone if the rm can reveal match information partially. However
if match information must be fully informative, then the rm chooses to advertise
price alone for intermediate visit costs.
c) High search costs
Consumers face high search costs if c > 1
2
: There are only two regions in -space
as depicted in Figure 7:
- when  < 1+c
2
; the rm needs to advertise both  and a price pm = 1 c
2
. A search
is not a¤ordable because the cost is high. Since sales are equal to 1 c
2(1 ) ; the market
is uncovered;
- when  > 1+c
2
; the rm also needs to advertise both price and . However, in
this region, it faces a strong positive network e¤ect, and therefore it charges p =   c
and sells to all consumers. Moreover, the rm must advertise its price even for  > 1;
because with c > 1
2
a search is not a¤ordable. Thus, no consumer searches even for a
strong bandwagon e¤ect due to a high cost of a search. No market exists if there is
no advertising.
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Figure 7: High search cost, c > 1
2
Proposition 5. When all consumers have identical visiting costs, the rm chooses
its optimal advertising strategy depending on the network externality and the value
of the visiting cost. The rm tends to disclose more information as the network
externality moves from positive to negative when the cost of a visit is low or moderate,
while a higher visiting cost always induces full disclosure.
Unlike in the previous literature, an advertising decision of a monopolist does
not only depend on c (as in Konishi and Sandfort, 2002; Anderson and Renault,
2006), but it also depends on the network e¤ect . In particular, a relatively weak
bandwagon e¤ect and a regular snob e¤ect require advertising if consumers are poorly
informed. As Anderson and Renault (2006) and Renault (2016) show, as the visit cost
grows, the optimal advertising strategy of the rm chomges from no advertising to full
disclosure. In our case, the optimal advertising strategy changes from no advertising
to full disclosure as  decreases. Moreover, market coverage positively reacts to the
increase in ; reaching its maximum when the externality is strong.
Heterogeneous visiting costs
Considering the advertising decision of the rm when consumers are di¤erent in
their visiting costs, this decision depends of the type of the consumption externality
and its size. Since the rm prefers advertising content which gives the highest prot,
it compares the prots under di¤erent advertising policies. When the rm provides
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no information, it receives n = s
(2 s)2 ; where s =
1
2(2 s)2 . If the rm chooses to
advertise its price alone, it obtains p = 2s
2(1 3s)
3





advertising policy is possible only for  < 0:36: Only match advertising takes place
for  < 1:5 and brings m = 1
4(2 )2 . Finally, advertising of both price and match
results in prots b = 1
16(1 ) if  6 0:75 and b =    1 if  > 1.
Since b is always greater than m for  6 0:75, the rm prefers full disclosure
to "match only" advertising. However, "both price and match" advertising is not
achievable for  2 (0:75; 1), and therefore the rm uses match advertising in this
region. Moreover, match advertising is also implemented for  2 [1; 1:5] because
m > b for these values. When  > 1:5; the rm cannot use match advertising
and thus it fully discloses both match information and price. Further analysis of the
advertising policies and their comparison are shown in the gures that follow.
Figures 8 and 9 show prot curves for di¤erent advertising policies of the rm
depending on the value of . The vertical axis is the value of prot and the horizontal
axis is a space of : Figure 8 shows four prot curves for  < 0:36; since equilibrium
with "only price" advertising does not exist for  < 0:36:
Clearly, "only price" advertising gives higher prots for  <  0:95. After that
point "both price and match" advertising dominates any other advertising decision.
"Match only" and zero advertising is never chosen, since they result in lower prots.
When the snob e¤ect is strong, it is more protable to inuence the expectations of
consumers with price only. If consumers benet substantially from a small clientele,
the rm advertises a high price to commit to a small sales in equilibrium. Indeed,
since the snob e¤ect makes demand less elastic, the equilibrium price with "price only"
advertising decreases in  as shown in Figure 4. With a strong snob e¤ect the rm
prefers to advertise a high price to support smaller sales, since demand is inelastic.
Therefore, "price only" advertising brings the highest prots to the rm16.
However, when  >  0:95, full disclosure brings higher levels of prot. Demand
16When the rm announces both price and match, demand becomes perfectly elastic, since the
rm charges a xed monopoly price p = 14 :
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Figure 8: Prot curves under di¤erent advertising policies,  < 0:36
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becomes less inelastic and hence it is more protable to have a higher clientele and
lower price. Since the "both price and match" option gives the highest sales among all
four possible advertising policies, the rm benets from disclosing both  and price.
Figure 9 shows prot curves for three advertising policies when  > 0:36. "Both
price and match" advertising dominates all other regimes for  2 ( 0:95; 0:75) for the
same reason as before: higher  implies a more elastic demand and thus it is protable
to have larger clientele, advertising a lower price helps the rm commit to larger sales
in equilibrium, and disclosing matches increases the probability of visits. Any other
advertising policy results in lower equilibrium sales.
However, "both price and match" advertising cannot be used for  2 (0:75; 1):
Therefore, "match only" advertising takes place for the given interval of : Moreover,
for  > 1 the rm serves the whole market and charges p =  1 under full disclosure,
which gives lower prots when  2 [1; 1:5]. Therefore, the rm also uses "match only"
advertising for  2 [1; 1:5]: For  > 1:5 the rm advertises both price and matches, and
sells to all consumers at price p =    1; which obviously increases in the externality,
since larger  implies greater benets from the bandwagon e¤ect.
To sum up, when consumers are di¤erent in their visiting costs, the optimal ad-
vertising policy depends on the consumption externality. Specically, if  <  0:95
the rm benets more from "price only" advertising; if  2 ( 0:95; 0:75) the rm
advertises both price and matches, and has not fully covered market; if  2 [0:75; 1:5]
the rm discloses horizontal matches only; if  > 1:5 the rm announces both matches
and price, and does not have a fully covered market.
Proposition 6. When consumers have heterogenous visiting costs, a monopoly
never remains silent and thus at least the price is advertised. As the network e¤ect
changes from negative to positive, the rm includes more information in its advertising
content.
The most important result is that with heterogeneous visiting costs, as  changes
from negative to positive values, the rm includes more information in its advertis-
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Figure 9: Prot curves under di¤erent advertising policies,  > 0:36
ing. This result is opposite the case with homogeneous cost. This occurs due to a
more sensitive demand, since the probability of buying does not only depend on the
consumers match alone, but also if her search cost is low enough. Moreover, for
a negative network e¤ect all consumers prefer a small clientele, because consumers
willingness to pay increases as clientele decreases. Therefore, providing little infor-
mation reduces visits and thus restricts demand, while for a positive network e¤ect
all consumers benet from a larger clientele, because consumerswillingness to pay
increases as clientele increases. Hence,providing more information increases visits and
expands demand. When the visit cost is the same for everyone, the rm only cares if
the expected benet of a search exceeds a given threshold, while the benet decreases
in :
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1.4 Results and Concluding Remarks
The preceding section considers the incentives for a monopoly to disclose market
information. In contrast to the previous literature, the model presented in this paper
combines network externalities and an information disclosure game. Network e¤ects
in consumption are considered using a model of a market where the decision to buy a
product depends on the total sales of the good. Disclosure game uses a framework of
search and advertising. This implies that if the rm remains silent, consumers must
search to obtain necessary market information; if the rm decides to reveal the infor-
mation itself in the form of advertising, the information becomes public knowledge.
This setting better describes the functioning of the markets with network goods, be-
cause the existing literature on the topic does not consider search frictions and price
commitment problem as the main obstacles for consumers when they face network
externalities. First, with network goods consumers make a buying decision based on
their expectations about the actual sales (clientele size). This can be easily done if
consumers are able to correctly foresee the market outcome. However, due to bounded
rationality or a lack of necessary market information (e.g. price) forming the correct
expectation is complicated. This explains why sellers of conspicuous goods usually re-
veal some information to help consumers to form correct expectations about possible
clientele size. This information is usually transmitted via announcements of the total
supply (or limited editions), product characteristics or price advertising. Second, the
announcements and price advertising work as a commitment device, since any public
announcement in the form of the o¢ cial advertising obliges the rm to full what it
announced. Therefore, consumers are assured that the rm will not deviate and break
promises.
Advertising as a disclosure method is widely used in search models to show that
information disclosure may expand demand and secure higher prots in the presence
of search costs (e.g. Anderson and Renault, 2006; Konishi and Sandfort, 2002). In
network economics, consumers are assumed to rationally anticipate prices and actual
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sales (e.g. Grilo et al., 2001; Griva and Vettas, 2011). However, this is only possible
with no information problems. Thus, this assumption has to be relaxed because in real
markets information is not perfect and therefore the formation of consumersexpec-
tations is complicated. The model considered in this paper describes how consumers
make their search and buying decisions, and what explains a rms decision regarding
what advertising content to use. This decision making process is a three-stage game.
In the beginning of the game a monopolist has an option to remain silent and keep
consumers uninformed or to advertise and reveal either price only, match only or both
price and consumersmatches which are ex ante unknown. When the rm chooses to
stay silent consumers search if their search cost exceeds the expected consumer surplus.
If the rm decides to advertise any information, consumers use this information to
compute the expected clientele and decide on buying. The advertising strategy of the
rm depends on two parameters: the size of the search cost and the measure of the
network e¤ect.
First, advertising is more likely for a negative network e¤ect and less likely for a
positive network e¤ect. In other words, the benets of search increase in the network
e¤ect, because a greater clientele size increases the expected consumer surplus. Search
benets are small in the case of a negative network e¤ect and therefore the only way
to secure prots is by advertising.
Second, a strong positive network e¤ect can eliminate a negative price e¤ect. With
a strong positive externality the demand function increases in price because a greater
clientele increases a consumers willingness to pay more than a reduction due to price
increase. Therefore, a monopolist prefers to sell to all consumers and charges a price
equal to the value of the network externality.
Third, the previous two results hold for any type of search cost: both homogenous
and heterogenous Homogenous search costs mean that all consumers face the same
value of the cost. With heterogenous search costs, consumers di¤er in the costs due
to their di¤erent value of time, di¤erent search abilities or locations..
Finally, when visiting costs are homogeneous, the advertising decision of the rm
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also depends on the costs of a search. When search costs are low or moderate, the rm
must advertise when the search costs exceed the expected benet of the search or when
price advertising gives higher prots. It is important to note that a monopolist needs
to provide as much information as possible for a negative network e¤ect, while a strong
positive network e¤ect brings higher prots when the rm remains silent. Depending
on the value of the network externality, the market can be either partially served
(uncovered market) or with the full participation of consumers (covered market).
When search costs are high, the only way to sell is to provide consumers with full
information about prices and product characteristics.
When visiting costs are heterogenous, zero advertising content is never chosen
by the rm; at least price or matches should be disclosed. The rm advertises its
price alone for a strong negative consumption externality, because the consumers
valuations for the good increase with a smaller clientele. Advertising a higher price
and undisclosed matches reduce visits and consequently prevent large equilibrium
sales. When demand becomes more elastic (increase in ), it is more protable to
charge a lower price and facilitate visits. This can be done by disclosing as much
information as possible. Thus, the rm prefers to advertise both price and matches
whenever it is possible for a positive network externality.
Compared to the network literature, these results show that market frictions that
complicate a consumers ability to form correct expectations signicantly a¤ect the
decision making process of consumers and therefore the market outcome. Moreover,
the addition of network externalities to the advertising game in the search model
enrich the conclusions of the search literature, because information disclosure deci-





As shown in Janssen et al. (2005), when every search is costly, two types of equi-
librium are possible. In particular, when the expected surplus of a purchase E(CS)
is equal to the visiting cost, either all consumers may decide to visit the store (this
equilibrium is considered in the paper) or consumers may randomize between visiting
the store and being inactive. The latter equilibrium implies that the probability of a
visit is equal to the share of visiting consumers, s: In equilibrium where consumers
randomize, s becomes endogenous and is determined in equilibrium.
Consumers may choose to randomize when E(CS) = 1
2(2 s)2 = c: Therefore, the
equilibrium share of visiting consumers or the probability of a visit, s, is a solution
to the equation 1
2(2 s)2   c = 0: The corresponding price is p =
1
2 s and equilibrium
sales are d = s

2 s : Let us investigate the properties of the equilibrium with partial
participation. First, to have positive price and sales, the condition (2  s) > 0 must






: Hence, p =
p























2c(2  ) > 1
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
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for di¤erent values of c. The vertical axis
is s; the horizontal axis is : When  is negative, the probability of a visit decreases
in the snob e¤ect and in the costs of search as expected because both negatively
inuence the consumer surplus. When  > 0, the probability of a visit decreases in 
and increases in c. If  grows and c is xed, this would increase E(CS); but to keep
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Figure 10: Locus of equilibrium s as a function of  for di¤erent c
E(CS) = 1
2(2 s)2 = c, the equilibrium s should decrease. If c grows and  is xed,
the equilibrium s should decrease to keep the condition for randomization unchanged.
As shown, for a particular set of parameters  and c an equilibrium with ran-
domizing consumers may exist when E(CS) = c: However, in the main analysis it is
assumed that all consumers prefer buying to being inactive.
42
Figure 11: Snob E¤ect
1B Actual market demand with network externalities
Following the analysis in Leibenstein (1950), market demand is a function of con-
sumersexpectations about the actual sales of the good with a network e¤ect. It is
therefore possible to treat expectations as a parameter and see how market demand
changes with di¤erent expectations. Let the market demand Dj indicate the quan-
tities demanded at alternate prices if all consumers expect that total sales are equal
to dj: Thus an increase in dj shifts the demand curve Dj outwards. Considering a
graphical analysis of snob and bandwagon e¤ects, assume that alternative consumers
expectations of the sales are dA < dB < dC < ::: < dN and corresponding demand
curves are DA; DB; DC ; :::; DN as shown in Figures 11, 12 and 13.
Snob E¤ect. Figure 11 demonstrates a snob e¤ect. As shown, a higher expected
clientele corresponds to lower levels of demand. If we assume that consumers are
rational and they can correctly foresee the total sales at every market price, then
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only one point on any of the curves DA; DB; DC ; :::; DN could be on the equilibrium
demand curve. The points on each curve DA; DB; DC ; :::; DN represent the amounts
that consumers expect to be the total sales. In these equilibrium points A, B, C, ...,
N market demand at market price is equal to consumersexpectations. The locus of
these points eD is therefore the actual demand curve for the conspicuous commodity.eD is less elastic compared to the demand curves DA; DB; DC ; :::; DN which treat
consumersexpectations as parameters. The snob e¤ect reduces the price sensitivity
of demand.
Let us consider a price increase leading to a transition from equilibrium C to
equilibrium A. Total decrease in the demanded quantities is dAdC , but only a part
of this change is the price e¤ect. To measure the price e¤ect we go along the demand
curve DC to a new price level, which tells us the quantity that would be demanded
at the new price if all consumers did not adjust their expectations. This transitional
point is denoted as X. Therefore, the price e¤ect is xdC . The snob e¤ect is dAx,
and shows that some consumers will enter the market due to the decreased expected
clientele in new equilibrium A, because lower clientele increases a valuation for the
good. Although price e¤ect dominates the snob e¤ect, market demand is now less
elastic since the price e¤ect and snob e¤ect are of the opposite direction. Reduced
demand elasticity allows the rm to charge a higher price.
Bandwagon E¤ect. Figure 12 demonstrates a bandwagon e¤ect. As shown,
a higher expected clientele corresponds to higher levels of demand. The rest of the
analysis of the bandwagon e¤ect is parallel to the snob e¤ect. The locus eD is the
actual demand curve for the conspicuous commodity. eD is more elastic compared
to the demand curves DA; DB; DC ; :::; DN which treat consumersexpectations as
parameters. This enhanced price sensitivity is explained by the bandwagon e¤ect. Let
us consider a price increase leading to a transition from equilibrium C to equilibrium
A. Total decrease in the demanded quantities is dAdC , but only a part of this change
is the price e¤ect. To measure the price e¤ect we go along the demand curve DC to a
new price level, which tells us the quantity that would be demanded at the new price
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Figure 12: Bandwagon E¤ect
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Figure 13: Strong Bandwagon E¤ect
if all consumers did not adjust their expectations. This transitional point is denoted
as X. Therefore, the price e¤ect is xdC . The bandwagon e¤ect is dAx, and represents
an additional reduction in the number of consumers who left the market due to the
decreased expected clientele in new equilibrium A. Therefore, the bandwagon e¤ect
enhances the price elasticity of market demand and thus it tends to lower prices. The
price e¤ect and bandwagon e¤ect are of the same direction.
Strong Bandwagon E¤ect. A di¤erent analysis takes place with a strong band-
wagon e¤ect when a higher price is always associated with larger equilibrium sales.
Actual market demand with fullled expectations is upward slopping now, as shown
in Figure 13. Let us assume that the initial market state was at point A. There
was a change in consumersexpectations about the actual sales from dA to dC and
a new equilibrium with fullled expectations is at point C. Higher clientele enhances
consumersvaluations for the network good and therefore there is a higher price in
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equilibrium C. To decompose the total change in the demanded quantities d, let us
measure both price and bandwagon e¤ects as shown in Figure 13. We go along the
demand curve DA to the new price level, which tells us the quantity that would be
demanded at the new price if all consumers keep their expectations xed. The corre-
sponding price e¤ect is xdA, which is negative. The bandwagon e¤ect is dCx, which
is positive. In the case of a strong bandwagon, a negative price e¤ect is dominated by
a positive e¤ect of the externality. Therefore, the total e¤ect is positive and actual
market demand is upward slopping. With a strong bandwagon e¤ect, an enhanced
consumersvaluation for the good dominates a loss in utility due to the increase in
price. Hence, the actual demand with fullled expectations has a positive slope.
Strong bandwagon e¤ect is not considered in Leibenstein (1950) and thus the case
with a strong bandwagon e¤ect is developed by the author of the thesis, while the
analysis of regular bandwagon and snob e¤ects is based on Leibenstein (1950).
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Chapter 2
Price Advertising Game in a Duopoly with
Network Externalities in Consumption
2.1 Introduction
In some markets, consumers choice and benets are dependent on the market
behavior of other consumers. The decision to buy a product is not only conditional
on the intrinsic utility of a good but also on how many other people buy the same
good. Economics points out two possible reasons: conformity and vanity.
Conformity is the desire to belong to a particular social group whic is charac-
terized by certain standards of behavior (also known as subcultures, fads, herding
behavior, trends, etc.)17. Conformity is evident in watching TV programs, reading
books, music and fashion trends, belonging to subcultures and so on. The second
kind of network externality in consumption, vanity, is characterized by the desire to
be di¤erent, exclusive and unique. Examples of vanity markets are status and luxury
products: expensive cars, jewelry, perfumes, antiques and other goods that directly
or indirectly signal social or income status. Both canformity and vanity are termed
consumption externalities18.
17People conform to these standards for di¤erent reasons. For example, Bernheim (1994) points
out three possible reasons: 1) individuals tend to imitate behavior patterns of those who are believed
to be better informed; 2) people act in the same way because it creates synergy e¤ects as in networks;
3) social standards and patterns of behavior help to coordinate a selection of particular equilibrium
if there is a case for multiple equilibria. Later Grilo et al. (2001) added one more reason: individuals
imitate each other to avoid social ostracism.
18Consumption externality originates from consumers preferences and thus directly enters the
utility function. Moreover, it serves as a means of vertical product di¤erentiation, i.e. the perceived
quality of a product is determined by the size of the externality. For example, if there are two
physically identical goods sold at the same price, consumers prefer a more popular good if there is
conformism, or they prefer the scarce one if they are snobbish and thus the inherent quality of the
good may be very di¤erent from the perceived one.
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Recent economic literature relates consumption externalities to network e¤ects.
A network e¤ect is a special kind of externality when a consumers utility or rms
prots are directly or indirectly a¤ected by the number of adopters of the same buying
decision or production technology. Therefore, conformity is a positive network e¤ect,
and vanity is a negative network e¤ect.
There are two interesting facts about markets with network externalities. First,
since a real valuation of the good is not only determined by its physical qualities but
also by its social attributes (or the size of the network e¤ect), in order to correctly
calculate a willingness to pay, consumers must foresee the actual clientele (the number
of consumers buying the same good) prior to the purchase. Their ability to do this is
usually limited by imperfect information or bounded rationality. It complicates the
decision making process of consumers and creates additional frictions, such as costly
search to access necessary market information. Second, in some markets with network
externalities, rms disclose the information needed to make a correct consumption
choice. For example, in a market of luxuries, rms usually send some information
about the availability of their products. They may either directly announce the total
number of items to be produced (Lamborghini and Jaguar announce the total number
of cars to be produced when they release a new model), or indirectly signal partial
information that helps people to anticipate the a¤ordability of the good (like limited
edition, individual production, expensive materials, etc.). It is also very common
that rms simply announce their prices in advance. This also helps consumers to
form expectations about how many people can a¤ord to buy the good (for instance,
Microsoft, Apple, Samsung make presentations of each new product and announce
their prices in advance).
These facts raise two interesting research questions: 1) what explains the incentives
of consumers to search when they face incomplete market information in a market
with network e¤ects; 2) what explains the incentives of rms producing a good with
network externality to disclose information. Specically, if prices are not observed
by consumers, they must engage in a costly search to correctly foresee the market
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outcome. Otherwise, rms may use price advertising to prevent consumers from
searching.
This chapter considers an advertising game in which duopolists decide on adver-
tising strategies in the beginning of the game and then compete in prices. Consumers
observe advertising decisions of the rms and search if the expected benets of search
exceed a search cost. The results suggest that negative consumption externality lowers
the minimum threshold level of search costs and increases the prots of the advertising
rm. Hence, at least one rm must advertise for a snob e¤ect. Weak bandwagon and
snob e¤ects lead to equilibria with interior solutions in which both rms have positive
market shares. When consumption externality exceeds a degree of product di¤eren-
tiation, the demand function of each rm becomes upward-sloping. The externality
dominates any strategic and price e¤ects, and therefore a higher price is necessarily
associated with a greater market share. Finally, the only equilibria with a strong
bandwagon e¤ect are those where only one rm supplies to an entire market.
A review of the related literature is given in section 2.2. Section 2.3 explains search
decisions of consumers and pricing rules of rms in every sub-subgame and describes
resulting equilibria in the advertising game. The conclusion and further discussion
are given in section 2.4.
2.2 Literature Review
Initially, social aspects of consumption were introduced by Veblen (1899) in his
famous work The Theory of Leisure Class. 50 years later, Leibenstein (1950) for-
malized Veblens theory and coined the notions of snobbism, bandwagon behavior
and the Veblen e¤ect. Snobbism describes a situation in which individual demand
for a good is negatively a¤ected by the quantity of the good sold in the market. It
is closely related to a desire for exclusivity, when uniqueness or scarcity of the good
delivers additional utility to buyers. Bandwagon is a case of conformity, fads, fashion
or trends. It describes a situation in which individual demand is positively a¤ected
by the number of buyers of the good. Finally, the Veblen e¤ect is related to market
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of status goods in which a purchase signals wealth or a high position in a social hi-
erarchy. These concepts by Leibenstein are widely used in economics, however, their
microeconomic foundations and market implications are still unclear and need deeper
investigation.
The present paper mostly addresses network economics which deal with network
externalities. There is a wide body of literature on networks. The central point of
this literature is the network e¤ect. Shy (2011) describes this as a special kind of
externality in which a consumers utility or rms prots are directly or indirectly
a¤ected by the number of adopters of the same buying decision or technology. Re-
search in network economics has contributed to the building of bridges between the
technological nature of networks and behavioral aspects of consumption.
In general, there are two kinds of network e¤ects: positive and negative. Positive
e¤ects are found in telecommunication, software and hardware production, mobile
connections and so on. In these industries, higher clientele size attracts more potential
consumers. Negative network e¤ect is usually represented by waiting costs in queues
and congestion (a consumer su¤ers a negative e¤ect only in case in which the clientele
exceedes the capacity level). These examples belong to the supply side of network
e¤ects because they are associated with technology.
When the network externality originates from consumer preferences and utility
formation, network e¤ects belong to the demand side and are therefore called con-
sumption externality. Using the notions of network economics, the bandwagon e¤ect
becomes a positive network e¤ect, meaning the consumers are better o¤ if the clientele
size is large. The snob/exclusivity e¤ect becomes a negative network e¤ect, meaning
that the consumers willingness to pay is decreasing along with the size of the clientele.
Positive network e¤ects and problems related to compatibility, technical standards
and interconnection are well studied in the literature on telecommunication, software
and IT applications. However, all these examples belong to the supply side, while
network e¤ects originating from the demand side are not well studied. Literature on
negative e¤ects is small and usually studies pricing and capacity level decisions.
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In a series of papers, Navon et al. (1995) and Grilo et al. (2001) study confor-
mity and vanity e¤ects. They consider consumption externalities in the framework
of spatial oligopoly models, particularly linear and circular cities. In their settings,
the bandwagon e¤ect is considered to be negative transportation costs and vanity is
additional charges. Depending on the relationships between the values of the band-
wagon e¤ect and transportation costs, weak or strong conformity e¤ects are possible.
Weak conformity allows both rms to coexist and enhances price competition. Strong
conformity gives market power to the rm with the initial clientele advantage and it
may serve the whole market. Vanity relaxes price competition and results in higher
prices. Under free entry, conformity reduces the number of rms and increases their
shares, while vanity does the opposite. The results are intuitive and consistent with
real world evidence. These papers, however, do not consider price commitment prob-
lems and the formation of consumer expectations. Indeed, a real valuation of a good
is only realized after all consumers have made their purchases. In the models of Navon
et al. (1995) and Grilo et al. (2001) consumers rationally anticipate future sales and
their expectations are fullled in equilibrium. The issues of price commitment and
expectation formation are taken into account by Economides and Himmelberg (1995),
and Griva and Vettas (2011). The latter work is a complex model of both horizontal
and vertical product di¤erentiation in which consumer expectations may or may not
be inuenced by prices. The authors show that a formation of expectations plays an
important role in the market outcome. However, these works consider the bandwagon
e¤ect only and thus their results may not be applicable in more general cases.
The most important limitation of the related papers is their assumption that
consumers are able to perfectly foresee the size of the clientele and therefore their
expectations are fullled in equilibrium. According to Katz and Shapiro (1985), the
core feature of markets with networks is that consumers must make their buying de-
cision before the actual network size in known. In the real world, market information
is imperfect and the rationality of consumers may be bounded. For example, prices
are not easily observed and thus consumers cannot always correctly foresee the fu-
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ture. It takes time, e¤ort and, in some cases, money to gather necessary information.
When consumers face imperfect information they engage in a costly search to access
necessary market information. Another way to resolve this problem is to allow rms
to disclose necessary information themselves in the form of advertising. A paper by
Konishi and Sandfort (2002) considers an advertising game in which rms may ad-
vertise their prices to expand their demand when consumers face a costly search. In
their model, in the beginning of the game rms independently and simultaneously
decide whether they want to advertise their prices. Then rms compete in prices, and
consumers decide on search observing advertising decisions of the rms. The authors
show that the advertising decision of the rms and resulting equilibria depend on the
amount of advertising costs. Konishi and Sandfort (2002) consider a simple duopoly
with homogeneous products and no consumption externality. However, their adver-
tising game can be also used in the case of the network e¤ects to study incentives
to advertise when rms sell goods with network e¤ects. Particularly, in Konishi and
Sandfort (2002) advertising equilibrium depends on the amount of advertising cost.
Meanwhile in case of network e¤ects, the equilibrium depends on the nature and a
magnitude of the externality.
Advertising is widely used in search models and models of asymmetric and incom-
plete information. For example, in Anderson and Renault (2006), through advertising
relevant information like price or product characteristics, rms can secure prots in
the presence of search costs. Once any piece of information is revealed, consumers can
update their beliefs, which are used in calculation of the expected benets of a search.
If these benets exceed the search cost, consumers participate in the market. In An-
derson and Renault (2009), rms use comparative advertising which reveals horizontal
match characteristics to consumers. The authors argue that in many cases consumers
may not know their matches to alternative products and they must inspect the good.
Comparative advertising may disclose product attributes and consumers can learn
their valuations for the goods. So advertising is an important transmiter of market
information which helps consumers to more correctly calculate their willingness to
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pay.
The present paper studies rmsincentives to advertise prices in the presence of
network e¤ects and imperfect information. It considers the advertising game used in
Konishi and Sandfort (2002) where rms compete in prices as in Grilo et al (2001),
and Vettas and Griva (2011). The search behavior of consumers is close to the one in
Anderson and Renault (2006).
2.3 Model
According to Miyao and Shapiro (1981), if a consumer faces a discrete choice (i.e.
must choose to buy from only one seller) and her utility depends on the clientele
of the seller, there is an uncertainty about the actual utility of each alternative.
Therefore, a consumers notional utility is a random variable. It is not certain what
alternative will be chosen, however, the chosen one brings the highest perceived utility.
Market demand for each alternative is thus proportional to the probability that a given
alternative is chosen. In turn, this probability is a function of the number of consumers
who choose the same alternative. These aspects of the discrete choice can be regarded
within the framework of a random utility model with network e¤ects.
There is a unit mass of consumers willing to buy at most one unit of the network
good. Consumers di¤er in their taste for the goods (horizontal matches). If a consumer
i chooses to purchase from a rm k, she receives utility Uik :
Uik = q + dk   pk + ik
This utility consists of four elements: 1) a utility gain q from the goods physical
functionality (or simply quality)19; 2) network externality dk, where dk is the ex-
pected clientele of rm k and  is a measure of the externality ( < 0 corresponds to
a negative network e¤ect (snob e¤ect),  > 0 is a positive network e¤ect (bandwagon
19It is assumed that q is rather high to ensure a full market coverage when both rms have positive






: This condition is dened by non-negative
consumer surplus in subsections 3.1 and 3.3.
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e¤ect)); pk is a price charged by rm k; nally, ik is a match value of consumer i
with a good of rm k. The match values are realizations of random variables which
are identically and independently distributed20. The corresponding distribution func-
tion is uniform and symmetric in an interval [ b; b]. In the framework of the random
utility approach, one can interpret  > 0 as a preference for diversity or a sensitivity
to a randomness in utility. Parameter b > 0 shows a length of the interval (2b) and
also is a measure of the heterogeneity of the consumers tastes. Larger b implies greater
di¤erences in consumerspreferences for goods. Let us denote a product of  and b
as t which shows a sensitivity of consumers to the heterogeneity in tastes21.
Both rms supply goods of the same physical quality q, however since di¤erent
consumers receive di¤erent random increments ik these goods are horizontally dif-
ferentiated. In addition, network externality in consumption introduces a vertical
di¤erentiation into this model. In case of a positive network e¤ect, a good with a
larger clientele increases the valuation of the product for all consumers. In contrast,
a negative externality decreases a valuation of the good with a larger clientele.
Consumers do not know their realizations of ik unless they visit the stores and
inspect the goods22. Moreover, they do not observe prices and thus cannot correctly
foresee the clienteles of the rms. To know both prices and actual valuations of the
goods, consumers must visit the stores. Visiting cost is c > 0. In this model, it
is assumed that once a consumer decides to search (visit the store) and pays c, she
receives all the necessary information23. Any consumer who decides to visit pays a
20That is, a consumer who visits the store, makes two stochastically independent draws from
random variables 1 and 2 which determine her valuations for goods 1 and 2.
21Parameter t = b is also known as a degree of product di¤erentiation, loyalty measure or a
transportation cost in the address models of product di¤erentiation.
22As discussed in Wernerfelt (1994) and Konishi and Sandfort (2002), when price advertising works
as a commitment device, stores always choose to advertise its price (due to demand expansion and
the hold-up problem). A desirable feature of the present paper is that a store may choose not to
advertise depending on the network externality. This is because willingness to pay is assumed to be
uncertain before a search.
This assumption also refers to cases when a consumer needs to inspect the good in reality, for
example, try on clothes, have a test drive in a car, smell a fragrance, try a hardware or a software,
etc.
23Assume that both stores are located at the same place, e.g., a shopping mall. Cost c is the cost
of visiting this shopping mall (transportation cost, monetary value of time, e¤ort, etc.). Once a
consumer is in the shopping mall, she can freely inspect both goods and know the prices).
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one-time sunk cost and discovers her valuations for both goods. A fully informed
consumer buys a good with a greater utility gain.
Firms may use price advertising before consumers visit if they consider it protable.
This means that an advertising rm announces its price, consumers use this public
knowledge, update their information set and correct their search behavior. Each
rm maximizes its prots given the anticipated response of the rival and consumers
decision to visit. Each consumer maximizes her utility given the available information
set.
The game considered in this model has a timing as follows:
1. In the beginning of the game, two rms independently and simultaneously
decide whether to advertise or not24. Information disclosure is truthful and costless.
Consumers do not know prices and cannot realize their horizontal matches until they
visit the stores and inspect the goods.
2. In the second stage of the game, three cases are possible:
Case A: Neither rm advertises. In this case rms set their prices simultaneously,
and these prices are not public information. Consumers must visit the stores to know
the prices and to inspect the goods, incurring a visiting cost.
Case B: Both rms advertise prices. In this case prices are set simultaneously
and are public knowledge, rms commit to these prices by advertising and consumers
can use the prices when calculating the expected benets of a purchase. Consumers
still need to visit the stores to inspect the goods and realize their matches.
This assumption about collocated stores is common in the literature on search goods (Wolinsky,
1983; Stahl, 1982; Konishi and Sandfort, 2002). If commodities are search goods, rms have a strong
incentive to collocate (same retail location). Since consumersvaluations are not known before a
search, a consumer visiting a concentration of stores has an increased likelihood of nding the good
for which her valuation is high. Consequently, collocated stores have higher probability of consumer
searches and purchases.
24It is important to discuss why advertising decisions of rms and price setting are not simultaneous
but sequential. Price advertising essentially works as a commitment device, therefore, if rms decide
on advertising and price at the same time, the game becomes a simultaneous price commitment
game.
As shown in Konishi and Sandfort (2002), if rms must decide on price commitment and price
setting at the same node of the game, a concept of Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not enough
to rene a set of equilibrium, because it weakens the predictive power of the standard equilibrium
concept. This is why sequential advertising and the pricing decision making process is chosen to
achieve a unique outcome.
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Case C: Only one rm advertises, the second one remains silent. In this case, the
advertising rm becomes a price leader and its silent competitor is a follower. The
leader sets its price rst and the follower sets its price accordingly Consumers observe
the announced price, calculate the best response of the silent rm and use available
information to form expectations about the market equilibrium. Consumers incur a
visiting cost, visit the stores and realize their horizontal matches.
3. Observing the advertising decision of the rm, consumers choose whether to
visit or not. If a consumer decides to visit, she incurs a visiting cost c: This cost is
the same for all consumers.
4. Once consumers visited the stores, they choose a good with the highest utility
gain.
Searching rule
Being in a given information set, a consumer decides to visit if the expected benets
(or the expected utility) of a purchase exceed the cost of visiting: E(Uik) > c. Since
prior to the visit all consumers are unaware of their horizontal matches, they have
similar searching rules and thus their search behavior is identical. This means that
the share of searching consumers s has only two values: 0 if no-one searches and 1 if
everyone searches25.
2.3.1 Neither rm advertises
When no rm advertises its price and consumers must visit the stores to inspect the
goods and learn the prices, the rms cannot inuence the search decision of consumers
s with prices. Therefore, given consumers decide to visit the stores, demand for rm




25To avoid randomization between searching and staying inactive, a case with E(U) = c corre-




0; if pl + b   6 0; pk = dk = 0
pl pk (dl dk)+b
2b
; if 0 < pl pk (dl dk)+b
2b
< 1
1; if pk + b   6 0; pl = dl = 0
Both rms maximizes their prots with prices:
1 = s p1

t+  (d1   d2)  p1 + p2
2t

2 = s p2

1  t+  (d1   d2)  p1 + p2
2t

First order condition with respect to prices gives reaction functions:
p1(p2) =
t+  (d1   d2) + p2
2
p2(p1) =
t+  (d1   d2) + p1
2
These reaction functions result in the following equilibrium prices:
p1 = t+
 (d1   d2)
3
p2 = t 
 (d1   d2)
3
The prices are increasing in t; because product di¤erentiation softens price competi-
tion. Larger expected clientele increases prices with the bandwagon e¤ect and reduces





 (d1   d2)
6t
Equilibrium market shares and prices crucially depend on the consumers expecta-
tions. There are three possible equilibria: two corner solutions when either rm can
capture the whole market and one interior solution. Therefore, the market share of
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rm 1 can be expressed as follows:
D1(d1; d2) =
8>>>><>>>>:





; if   3t <  (da   db) < 3t
0; if  > 3t and d1 = p1 = 0
When consumers believe that one rm will have a signicantly larger market share
than another one, a strong bandwagon ( > 3t) may lead to an equilibrium in which
one rm captures the entire market. When the di¤erence in the expected clientele
sizes is not that signicant, both rms can have positive market shares. As one can
see, a greater value of t makes it possible that both rms can operate with positive
market shares. Greater heterogeneity in consumers tastes allows both rms to coexist,
since consumers value diversity of products.
An equilibrium with rational expectation implies that consumersexpectations are
fullled in equilibrium and thus d1 = sD1 and d2 = sD2 Another explanation is a
market clearance condition: rms produce as much as consumers are willing to buy.
Three cases are possible, depending on the value of the network externality :
When  < 3t, i.e. there is a snob e¤ect or a weak bandwagon e¤ect, consumers
expect that market shares will not be extreme since neither rm can attract a critical
mass of consumers to ensure a corner solution. Indeed, a negative network e¤ect can
never induce a corner solution and a positive network e¤ect with  < 3t is too weak to
make consumers expect an extreme bandwagon. Therefore, both rms have positive
market shares. Moreover, if consumers expect that both rms will equally share the
market, their beliefs are fullled in equilibrium and thus the only equilibrium26 that
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26No other market sharing can be maintained as an equilibrium with fullled expectations, where
actual sales must be equal to the expected clientele size that does not hold with unequal market
shares: when 12 < d1 < 1; price competition implies D1 > d1; when 0 < d1 <
1
2 ; price competition
implies D1 < d1:
Moreover, since q is large enough to ensure that consumers with the lowest consumer surplus are
willing to buy, each rm has a half of the market.
The consumer with the lowest consumer surplus is indi¤erent between buying from 1 or 2 and
 =  b: She receives CS = q + 2   t  b = q +

2   2t: Since q > 2t 

2 , even the lowest type buys
and thus the market is fully covered.
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It is interesting to note that market price does not reect the e¤ect of : The reason
is that, since rms do not advertise their prices, they cannot inuence the search
decision of consumers and therefore they are not able to internalize the consumption
externality with their prices. This explains why silent rms set prices which do not
depend on the network e¤ect :
When  > 3t, the network good exhibits a strong consumption externality. Three
types of expectations can be fullled in equilibrium: rm 1 captures a whole market;
rm 2 captures a whole market; both rms have equal shares with full coverage. If
consumers expect that market shares will have signicant di¤erences, then a rm
with a greater expected market share can capture a whole market. If consumers
expectations are not that extreme, both rms can enjoy equal clienteles. In a corner
solution, an active rm charges a price p =    t and obtains a prot equal to    t,
since its market share is 1. Higher bandwagon e¤ect allows the active rm to charge
a higher price, since the consumers valuation for the good is increasing in :
When  = 3t; any expectation can be fullled in equilibrium and thus correspond-
ing prices are p1 = 2d1t, p2 = 2(1  d1)t: This is the only case in which rms can have
positive but not equal market shares.
As one can see, when  > 3t; multiple equilibria arise. It is thus important to
discuss how consumers can coordinate and choose one of the candidate equilibria. One
of the most reasonable ways is to assume that all consumers prefer the equilibrium
with the highest expected utility gain. Prior to the search decision, the expected
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solution with Dk = 1 results in E(Uk)
cor = q+ t: The latter is larger for  < 16
3
t+2q:
This implies that consumers coordinate and all form expectations that correspond to




When  = 3t; the expected utilities are E(Uk)int =   t12+tdk+qdk and E(Uk)
cor =
q+ t. Since dE(Uk)
int
ddk
> 0; all consumers prefer to expect a greater market share of rm
k in the equilibrium with fullled expectations. If dk approaches 1, E(Uk)int tends to
q + t  t
12
which is lower than E(Uk)cor: This implies that with  = 3t, all consumers
would like to coordinate in their expectations to have an equilibrium in which either
rm captures the market entirely.
Proposition 7: When neither rm advertises their prices and consumers co-
ordinate their beliefs such that they receive the highest expected consumer surplus,
equilibrium with fullled expectations is as follows: 1) if  < 3t, there is a unique
equilibrium where rms equally share the market and charge prices equal to t; 2) if
3t 6  < 16
3
t+ 2q, either rm can capture an entire market charging a price equal to
   t; if  > 16
3
t+ 2q; interior solution with equal shares prevail in equilibrium.
The search decision of consumers crucially depends on the expected clientele sizes
of the rms, since these parameters determine the benets of buying. Consumers will
visit only if the expected benets of a purchase exceed visiting cost c.
When no rm advertises its price, consumers rationally anticipate rms to behave
as stated in Proposition 7 and thus E(Uk)int =
6q 4t+3
12
= c1 and E(Uk)cor = q+t = c2:
When  < 3t, consumers decide to search and visit the stores if visiting cost c 6 c1:
When  > 3t; consumers decide to visit if c 6 c2: The search benet is decreasing in t
and increasing in : This means that stronger product di¤erentiation tends to reduce
the motivation of consumers to search, because higher t decreases price elasticity,
softens price competition and consequently reduces consumer surplus. In contrast,
positive network e¤ect increases consumer surplus and thus encourages consumers to
search. Meanwhile, negative network e¤ect decreases the benets of a search and thus
consumers are expected to search less for negative :
Lemma 5. If neither rm advertises, consumers are expected to search more when
product di¤erentiation is not strong and consumption e¤ect is positive. In contrast,
when product di¤erentiation is rather strong and consumption externality is negative,
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consumers are expected to search less. In turn, this implies that price advertising is
suitable for a higher product di¤erentiation and strong snob e¤ect.
To sum up, if rms do not reveal information about their prices, they are not able
to inuence the expectations of consumers and their search decisions. Therefore rms
cannot internalize consumption externalities with prices and take both expectations
and searching rules as given. When the network e¤ect is a strong bandwagon behavior,
multiple equilibria arise and thus consumers need to coordinate their expectations to
achieve the most desirable outcome with the highest expected consumer surplus.
2.3.2 Both rms advertise
When both rms announce prices, consumers learn prices but still need to visit the
stores to inspect the goods and choose the one with the best horizontal match. In this
scenario, price advertising serves both as a source of information and as a credibility
instrument because of truth-in-advertising laws. Consumers can use the announced
prices to form their expectations, which are perfectly fullled in equilibrium.
It is worth mentioning that exactly this situation is studied by Navon et al. (1995),
Grilo et al. (2001) and Griva and Vettas (2011). In all papers, the authors assume
that prices are known to consumers and thus due to consumer rationality the expected
clientele sizes are perfectly realized in equilibrium. Therefore, the analysis in this
section is parallel to the logic of the above papers27.
When prices are advertised, d1 and d2 can be correctly foreseen by consumers and
thus both rms treat d1 and d2 as sD1 and sD2 respectively. Therefore, the demand
function of rm 1 is D1 =
p2 p1+t 
2(t ) . Three situations are possible: if t    > 0;
there is a snob e¤ect or a weak bandwagon e¤ect and thus we have a regular demand
function; when t    < 0; there is a strong positive consumption externality which
dominates the negative price e¤ect and the demand function becomes increasing in
price; when  = t, the strength of the bandwagon e¤ect is equal to the degree of
27A more detailed discussion of the case when prices are public information is given in Section 4
in Grilo et al. (2001).
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product di¤erentiation.
To start with, let us consider a case when t > : Since consumer expectations
are perfectly inuenced with advertised prices, rmsdemand functions depend on








2(t ) ; if    t < pk   pl < t  
0; if pl 6    t and pk = dk = 0
However, it is clear that only the interior solution exists, because corner solutions
do not satisfy the condition that t > : If rm 1 captures a whole market, rm 2 is
inactive and charges p2 = 0: This implies that rm 1 should charge p1 6    t < 0:
This is not rational and thus the corner solution does not exist. The same logic applies
to the case when rm 2 captures an entire market.
The interior solution is characterized by prices that maximize prots of rms:
1 = pa






1  t     p1 + p2
2(t  )

First order conditions with respect to prices give two reaction functions:
p1(p2) =
t   + p2
2
p2(p1) =
t   + p1
2
Corresponding equilibrium prices are p = p1 = p

2 = t   : In comparison to the
previous case where prices in which not advertised by rms, in this scenario, rms
can internalize a consumption externality with advertised prices. Advertised prices
account for the network e¤ect and thus they depend on . This result supports the
ndings of Grilo et al. (2001) and Griva and Vettas (2011) that the bandwagon e¤ect
reduces market prices and the snob e¤ect relaxes price competition. In particular, the
snob e¤ect increases prices and the bandwagon e¤ect tends to decrease them. The
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snob e¤ect enhances perceived di¤erences between products, strengthens the e¤ect
of tastes heterogeneity, i.e. reduces price elasticity and thus increases rmsmarket
power. In contrast, bandwagon works to soften di¤erences in tastes and can incentivize
a consumer to buy a good with a worse horizontal match but with a larger network.
In other words, it increases price elasticity and thus reduces prices.
Corresponding market shares are equal to 1
2
and prots are t 
2
for each rm28.
It is important to note that no rm has an incentive to deviate and capture a whole
market. For example, if rm 1 wants to deviate from the equilibrium price where both
rms share the market, it should charge a price such that t   > p1 + t  ; because
when rm 2 charges p2 = t   , the only possibility to capture the whole market is
to charge a price p1 6 p2   t + : But this gives p1 = 0, which is clearly dominated
by the price which allows both rms to have positive market shares. The same logic
applies to the deviation of rm 2:
Given this pricing behavior of two rms, consumers decide to visit if their visiting




= c3: It is clear that when prices are advertised, consumers take
the prices into consideration and hence the expected utility of a consumer prior to the
visit is more sensitive to : This means that rms can internalize the consumption
externality through prices and inuence consumer visiting decisions with prices.
When t < ; the demand functions of both rmsDk =
pl pk+t 
2(t ) become increasing
in prices. Since the value of the consumption externality, ; exceeds the degree of
tastes heterogeneity t, the benet of being in a greater network dominates the loss
due to a purchase of a product with a worse match. The more intensive the network
externality is, the greater the valuation for the good is, therefore a larger market share
is always associated with a higher price. A demand function of rm k is given by:
28It is important to mention that t should not take extreme values, to gaurantee that consumer
surplus is not negative under the full market coverage.
In this interior solution, a consumer with the lowest match receives U( b) = q   2t + 32 : This















2(t ) ; if t   < pb   pa <    t
0; if pl 6    t and pk = dk = 0
As in Grilo et al. (2001) and Griva and Vettas (2011), when the consumption
externality is stronger than product di¤erentiation ( > t) ; multiple equilibria exist.
When price di¤erence is t  < pb pa <   t; any combination of prices can support
this condition. Moreover, corner solutions in which one rm captures an entire market
are also possible. This happens, because demand functions are now increasing in their
prices, which means that a rm charging a higher price will also have the larger market
share. A strong positive consumption externality dominates both strategic and price
e¤ects of competition. A more detailed discussion of the equilibria is in Appendix 2A.
When  = t; the outcome looks like the Bertrand paradox. The rm with the
lowest price can capture the market and therefore rms set prices at marginal costs,
since with  = t; the two goods are perfect substitutes. Consumers randomize between
rms, but rmsprots are nil.
To restrict the set of possible equilibria it is important to discuss how out-of-
equilibrium beliefs are formed. The renement of equilibria in Grilo et al.(2001) and
Griva and Vettas (2011) di¤ers but leads to the same result. In both papers the au-
thors come to the conclusion that, with a strong network e¤ect, only the equilibrium,
in which one rm captures a whole market, survives the renement. Specically, Grilo
et al (2001) suggests using "invariance axiom" to show that at least one rm sets a
price equal to zero while the other rm charges a price which does not exceed the limit
price. When a rm charges a positive equilibrium price, it captures the entire mar-
ket29. Another renement method is used in Griva and Vettas (2011). The authors
apply an assumption about the continuity of expectations: a small deviation from
equilibrium prices leads to a small change in consumers expectations about market
shares, i.e. consumers do not alter their expectation drastically when they observe
29This axiom and its proof are demonstrated in Section 4 in Grilo et al. (2001).
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a deviation from the equilibrium prices30. In both papers, the authors suggest that
after renement, only corner solutions survive.
Another renement leading to the same result is a conjecture about how consumers
will react to a price change. Specically, the probability that a consumer buys from
rm k does not increase with the price of rm k: In other words, consumers still have
a non-increasing demand function (higher price reduces a probability of buying) even
when  > t. With this renement, there are no interior solutions where both rms
have positive market shares. Indeed, when both rms charge positive prices, each
rm would like to decrease its price and steal consumers from the rival. This leads us
to the Bertrand paradox, in which both rms price at nil and consumers randomize
between rms. However, there are two corner solutions. Assume that rm 1 charges
p1 = 0 and rm 2 charges p2 =    t: If it is an equilibrium, then no rm has an
incentive to deviate. It is not reasonable for rm 2 to decrease its price, because it
already has all the consumers, so a price decrease would simply reduce prots. The
rm will not consider it protable to increase p2 since p2 =  t is exactly the limiting
price that allows rm 2 to serve all consumers. Firm 1 will never deviate to p1 < 0,
since this would lead to losses. Any price p1 > 0 is not rational at all, since rm 2
has set a limiting price and owns all the consumers. Therefore, with a conjecture that
price still negatively a¤ects demand even with  > t, only three price pairs (p1; p2)
survive: (0;    t) ; (   t; 0) ; (0; 0) :
From a large set of possible equilibrium price pairs, three are left after the above
renement. However, two of them are Pareto superior to the third one. Speci-
cally, equilibria with (0;    t) and (   t; 0) are payo¤ dominant, meaning that they
both o¤er to each rm at least as much payo¤ as the Nash equilibrium with (0; 0).
Therefore, in the rest of the paper these two equilibria participate in further analysis.
Summing up, when the consumption externality is stronger than product di¤er-
entiation ( > t) ; there are only two equilibria after the equilibrium selection where
either rm supplies to an entire market, charging a price p =    t:
30Both the renement and its proof are given in Section 5 in Griva & Vettas (2011).
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Proposition 8. When both rms announce their prices and t > ; rms share
the market equally and charge a price p = t  , no rm has an incentive to deviate
and capture a whole market. In contrast, when t <  only one rm sells to the whole
market under renements and charges a price p =    t:
Given this pricing behavior of two rms, consumers decide to visit if their visiting
cost c does not exceed the expected utility of buying. In the case of the corner solution
E(Uk)
cor = q + t = c2.
2.3.3 One rm advertises and one stays silent
When only one rm decides to advertise its price, then the advertising rm becomes
a price leader and charges its price rst. The silent rm takes the advertised price
as given31 and chooses its price as a follower. As a result, this situation looks like a
Stackelberg price competition, in which the silent rm becomes a follower in a sub-
subgame and takes the price of the advertising rm as given. Consumers still need
to visit the stores to inspect the goods (in order to choose the good with the most
suitable horizontal match) and incur some visiting cost c.
Without loss of generality, assume that rm 1 advertises and 2 stays silent. The
sequence of moves in this subgame thus begins with rm 1 announcing its price rst.
It is important to discuss how consumers form their expectations and treat d1 and d2:
The advertising rm commits to its price, advertising p1, consumers know that the
price of rm 2 is its best response to the advertised price of rm 1. Consumers are able
to calculate p2 because the reaction function of rm 2 is common knowledge. This
allows consumers to exactly foresee what price will be charged by rm 2 in response
to any advertised price of rm 1, and to make their search decision accordingly in
every subgame32. By this reasoning d1 and d2 can be also calculated by consumers
31If any rm decides to advertise its price, then its advertising functionss as a commitment in-
strument. By "truth-in-advertising" law, any public announcement obliges rms to full what is
advertised.
32The inference should be correct in each subgame. Each subgame starts by announcing p1, and
consumers make their search decision anticipating how rm 2 responses to p1: Firm 2 does not know
the consumer decision when it sets p2:
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when they observe advertised p1 and know the best response of rm 2. In turn, the




Firm 1 accounts for the price reaction of its follower and thus it chooses p1 that
maximizes its prot:
1 = s p1









This prot function is maximized at p1 =
3(t )
2







, and p2 =
5(t )
4
. Prots are 1 = 9(t )
16
, 2 = 25(t )
32
:
Both prices are higher than in the case with full disclosure and p1 > p

2: When only
one rm advertises, it can internalize the e¤ect of consumption externality and thus
both prices depend on : As one can see, the advertising rm receives lower prots
in equilibrium than the silent one. This is in line with the results of Dowrick (1986):
when two rms compete in prices and produce substitutes, the price-follower has a
second-mover advantage and receives higher prots. Intuitively, the reason that a
rm prefers to be a follower in the price setting game is that the leader has to reduce
output to support the price, whereas the follower can take the price as xed by the
leader and produce as much as it wants; i.e., the follower can free-ride on the output
restriction of the leader33. Meanwhile, the price leaders prot is greater than the
prot in 2.3.2.
Consumers rationally anticipate these market outcomes and visit if the expected








[q + dk   pk + k] dkdl







respectively. Prior to a visit, a consumer does not know what
product she will buy when she visits the stores, however, she expects that in equi-
33In contrast, being a leader is always preferred to being a follower when rms compete in quan-
tities, because of the rst-mover advantage.
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Thus, the visiting decision of consumers s equals 1 if c 6 c4 and equals 0 if c > c4:
Since quality q is assumed to be high enough, there is full market coverage.34
Is there an equilibrium with a corner solution? Can rm 1 advertise a price that
causes all consumers to only buy from it? A condition that supports this equilibrium
is thatD1 = 12+
p2 p1
2(t ) > 1 or p2 p1 > t : In this equilibrium, p2 = 0 and p1 =  t:
The latter condition states that this can happen only for a strong positive network
e¤ect,  > t: Moreover, rm 1 strongly prefers to capture a whole market when the
interior solution brings lower prots: 9(t )
16
<    t: This happens only for  > t:
Proposition 9. When one rm advertises its price and another stays silent, the
snob e¤ect and the weak bandwagon e¤ect ( < t) allow both rms to have positive
market shares. The advertising rm charges a higher price and receives a higher prot
(compared to the case with no disclosure). This interior solution is only possible for
c 6 c4: When consumption externality is strong and positive ( > t), advertising rm
sets a price that allows it to capture a whole market. In this case consumers search if
c 6 c2:
As shown above, when only one rm advertises, the other may not follow the same
strategy. A non-advertising rm benets from its rivals advertising which works as
price commitment, suggesting free-riding by the non-advertising rm. Indeed, as one
can see, silent rm earns more in the interior case.
2.3.4 Advertising game
In the previous sections, three subgames where rms choose their pricing were
considered. The advertising game played in the rst stage can be represented in the
strategic forms as demonstrated in Figures 14, 15 and 16. These strategic forms
34Indeed, a consumer with the lowest match gets U1( b) = 8q+15 20t8 and U2( b) =
8q+15 18t
8 :
As one can see, to have full coverage it must be that 8q + 15   20t > 0: However, this con-









contain rms prots and conditions under which a particular Nash equilibrium exists.
Each rm has two disclosure strategies: price advertising (AD) and being silent (NA).
There are four possible equilibria: both rms stay silent; rm 1 advertises only; rm
2 advertises only; both rms announce their prices. Depending on the strength of the
network externality , three intervals are considered:  < t (negative network e¤ect
and weak bandwagon e¤ect), t 6  < 3t (strong bandwagon e¤ect),  > 3t (extremely
strong network e¤ect). The analysis that follows is similar to that one in Konishi and
Sandfort (2002)35.
The snob e¤ect and weak bandwagon e¤ect
A case when  < t corresponds to a snob e¤ect and weak bandwagon e¤ect.
A strategic form of the game is represented in Figure 14. The equilibrium strategy
conguration changes depending on the values of the visiting cost c; degree of product
di¤erentiation t and consumption externality : Each equilibrium is described by the
corresponding prots of the rms and the conditions under which this equilibrium
exists.
There are four important observations:
1) At least one rm should advertise a price for a negative consumption externality.
Indeed, given that a rival chooses NA strategy, advertising brings higher prots when
 < t
9
: Moreover, advertising is always a dominant strategy (the only strategy) when
the search cost exceeds the minimum threshold (c1 or c4). The expected benet of a
search decreases with negative  and therefore advertising is the only way to avoid
consumer inaction.
2) When only one rm advertises its price, both rms gain the highest prots.
However, the leader receives a smaller prot than its follower. This is consistent
with a general result of the Stackeberg price competition, that a price leader faces
a rst-movement disadvantage36. When c 6 c3 and  < t9 this case becomes one
35In Konishi and Sandfort (2002) advertising equilibrium depends on the value of advertising. In
our model, the equilibrium depends on  and c:
36Price competition with sequential movements gives higher prots to both rms compared to
semultaneous price setting. However, the leader earns a lower prot than the follower. Quantity
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Figure 14: Snob e¤ect and weak bandwagon e¤ect,  < t
of the "battle of sexes", thus, there are two pure strategy equilibria (NA;AD) and
(AD;NA) :
3) When the visiting cost is rather high (the cost exceeds a threshold value c4),
the only possible equilibria is one in which both rms advertise their prices, which
takes place if c 6 c3:
4) A weak bandwagon e¤ect and snob e¤ect lead to the equilibria with interior
solutions where both rms have positive market shares.
Strong bandwagon e¤ect
A case when t 6  < 3t corresponds to a strong bandwagon e¤ect. A strategic
form of the game is represented in Figure 15. Given that the rival stays silent, the
rm also stays silent if t
2
>    t: It means that the equilibrium in which neither rm
advertises occurs when t 6  < 3t
2
and c 6 c1: When 3t2 6  < 3t and for c 6 c2,
advertising becomes a dominant strategy for each rm and thus only equilibria with
two advertising rms are possible37. As shown in section 2.3.2, in these equilibria
either rm can capture a whole market.
competition leads to a reverse result.
37When only one rms advertises and  > t; a corner solution exists where the leader sells to the
whole market. It implies that price advertising becomes a dominant strategy for both rms.
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Figure 15: Strong bandwagon e¤ect, t <  < 3t
Figure 16: Extreme bandwagon e¤ect,  > 3t
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Extreme bandwagon e¤ect
This is a case in which  > 3t corresponds to an extremely strong positive exter-
nality. A strategic form of the game is represented in Figure 16. The only possible
equilibria are those in which both rms choose price advertising independent of the
values of the exogenous parameters. When the bandwagon e¤ect is very strong, the
AD strategy becomes dominant for both rms. This implies that the resulting equi-
libria have one rm supplying an entire market.
Let us summarize all results in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10. In the rst stage, when rms decide on their advertising strate-
gies, price is advertised by at least one rm for a negative consumption externality.
A weak bandwagon e¤ect and snob e¤ect ( < t) always lead to the interior solution
in which both rms have positive market shares. When the bandwagon e¤ect is strong
(t 6  < 3t), both rms may not advertise if the search cost is not high enough, oth-
erwise the advertising strategy becomes dominant and thus corner solutions arise with
either rm serving all consumers. When the bandwagon e¤ect is extreme ( > 3t),
both rms choose to advertise but only one rm is active in the market.
2.4 Concluding Remarks and Further Discussion
In some markets, the individual decision to buy a good depends on the number
of other consumers who choose the same product. This phenomenon is mainly found
in the markets with network e¤ects, such as telecommunication, fashion, luxury and
status goods, books, TV programs, music, etc. If the network e¤ect originates from
the consumers preferences, it is called a demand side network e¤ect or a network
externality in consumption. If a consumer benets from the larger product clientele,
there is a case of a positive network e¤ect (also known as the bandwagon e¤ect and
conformity). If the valuation of the good is decreasing with the size of the clientele,
there is a case of a negative network e¤ect (vanity, the snob e¤ect).
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Existing literature on network economics is extensive, but it is mostly focused on
supply side e¤ects and problems related to compatibility and imitations (like software,
hardware and telecommunication). Demand side e¤ects are only represented by a
couple of papers considering consumption externalities in markets of di¤erentiated
products. Their main conclusions are that the snob e¤ect softens price competition,
a weak bandwagon e¤ect tends to lead to lower prices and a strong bandwagon e¤ect
leads to greater market concentration.
Although related papers explain how the sellers of goods with network e¤ects reach
a particular equilibrium under consumption externalities in a price setting game, they
make quite a strong assumption about consumer behavior. Specically, it is assumed
that consumers are fully informed and rational and prices are public information. This
assumption limits the analysis, because in reality prices may not be easily observed
and market information is imperfect. In the case of network goods, this condition
becomes crucial, because in order to realize a correct valuation of the good, a con-
sumer must perfectly foresee how many other consumers will choose the same good.
With unobserved prices and incomplete information, this becomes complicated. One
possibility to resolve this market friction is to introduce a search, when consumers
costly gather necessary information. Another way is to allow rms to disclose this
information themselves by means of advertising. Once search and advertising are
possible, the problem of imperfect information is resolved and thus consumers may
rationally foresee the market outcome.
This chapter studies the incentives of duopolists to advertise their prices and also
considers how consumers decide to search when they face incomplete information in a
market with network goods. To answer the rst research question, the paper considers
an advertising game in which, at the rst stage, rms decide on advertising strategies,
then they set prices and, at the last stage of the game, consumers decide on search
and buying. Once the advertising decisions of rms are observed by consumers, they
search if the expected search benet exceeds their search costs.
When neither rm advertises, rms are not able to internalize the consumption ex-
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ternality and their pricing does not reect the real valuation of the product. Moreover,
when prices are not advertised, rms are not able to inuence the search decisions of
consumers. When at least one rm decides to advertise its price, the consumption
externality may be internalized and market prices account for the value of the network
e¤ects.
The expected benets of a search are decreasing with the degree of product di¤er-
entiation and the strength of the snob e¤ect. Higher product di¤erentiation reduces
price elasticity of demand and thus allows rms to charge higher prices, which in turn
lower consumer surplus. A stronger snob e¤ect increases consumer utility losses and
thus also reduces expected search benets. In contrast, bandwagon e¤ect increases
the benets of search because consumer utility grows as more consumers buy the same
good.
The advertising game considered in section 2.3.4 demonstrates how rms decide
on price advertising. There are four main results which explain what consitions inu-
ence the information disclosure by rms. Firstly, at least one rm must advertise for
a negative network e¤ect. A negative network e¤ect lowers the minimum threshold
level of search costs and increases the prots of the advertising rm compared to a
case with no disclosure. Secondly, a weak bandwagon e¤ect and snob e¤ect lead to
equilibria with interior solutions where both rms have positive market shares. This
means that neither rm is able to capture a whole market. Thirdly, when consump-
tion externality exceeds the degree of product di¤erentiation, the demand function of
each rm becomes upward-sloping. A strong positive network e¤ect dominates any
strategic and price e¤ects and therefore a higher price is necessarily associated with a
greater market share. Fourthly, applying the renements considered in 2.3.2, the only
equilibria with a strong bandwagon e¤ect are those in which only one rm supplies
the entire market.
Since the major goal is to study how network externalities a¤ect the decisions of
rms to advertise prices, the most important conclusion is that at least one rm must
advertise for a negative network e¤ect and an extreme bandwagon e¤ect. This means
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that the presence of network externalities forces rms to disclose market information
and remedy search frictions.
Summing up, a market equilibrium with network e¤ects depends not only on the
type of consumption externality and degree of product di¤erentiation (as shown in
the previous literature), but also depends on the advertising decision of the rms and
search conditions when consumers face market frictions such as imperfect information
and bounded rationality.
Further research on the topic should incorporate the problem of asymmetry of
rms. In the framework of the present model, three sources of asymmetry may arise.
The rst is locational advantage. This phenomenon is considered in Navon et al.
(1995) and Grilo et al. (2001). Locational advantage means that a rm may not
necessarily be located on the edges of the Hotelling line, but somewhere inside the
interval. If any rm has a larger share of locked-in consumers, it will be able to
have a greater clientele and can even more easily capture the whole market if the
bandwagon e¤ect is strong enough. The second source is vertical di¤erentiation of
competing products. When any rm has a higher quality good, a greater quality
di¤erence may result in higher prices and may also allow the rm to capture an entire
market (as demonstrated in Griva and Vettas, 2011). The third source of asymmetry
is the di¤erence in the strength of consumption externality. A rm with a greater
bandwagon e¤ect will gain more from the larger clientele and therefore will be able to
capture the whole market. In contrast, a rm with a stronger negative externality will
gain more because demand for its good will become less elastic. It is also expected
that a combination of these sources of asymmetry may also lead to interesting results.
For example, a rm with a low quality good but a stronger bandwagon e¤ect may have
a larger market share and even higher price. This result is opposite to the vertical
di¤erentiation models in which a rm with a higher quality good receives a larger
market share and charges a higher price.
All these possible extensions of the model may lead to richer inferences on price
advertising and consumer searches in market with consumption externalities.
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Figure 17: Multiple Equilibria when  > t
2.5 Appendix: Analysis of equilibria 2A
Analysis of equilibria when  > t
When the bandwagon e¤ect exceeds a degree of product di¤erentiation, multiple
equilibria arise. Particularly, three types of market division may exist: rm 1 captures
the market entirely; rm 2 captures the whole market; both rms have positive market
shares. Firm 1 gets all consumers when p1  p2 6    t and rm 2 gets all consumers
if p1   p2 > t   . An interior solution takes place when the price di¤erence is such
that t   < p2   p1 <    t. Figure 17 shows a division of the price space into three
regions: I, II and III. Let us consider each of them in more details.
Region I is always associated with the case in which rm 1 has zero market share
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because it lies above the line p1   p2 = t   . No price pair in region I that can
be an equilibrium, since rm 1 would like to deviate and decrease its price down to
a level when p2   p1 6    t: Therefore there is no equilibrium in Region I. The
same reasoning is applicable to region II, where rm 2 will always nd it protable to
decrease its price.
Region III is associated with three types of market division: two corner solutions
and multiple interior solutions. Let us divide region III into four zones: square A,
triangles B and C, and zone D.
In zone A, prices are rather low to allow rms to undercut each other. Neither
rm 1 nor rm 2 can deviate and move to regions I or II. Therefore any price pairs
can constitute an equilibrium with three possible outcomes: either corner or interior
solutions.
In zone B, rm 1 can never capture the market, because rm 2 can always decrease
its price and gain a positive market share. Therefore, either rm 2 captures the
whole market or both rms have positive market shares. The latter is possible if rm






p1    + t. This condition is shown in Figure 18: price pairs which are above line (2)
can support interior solutions. Zone B belongs to this set.
Zone C is a reverse zone B, so rm 2 is not able to serve all consumers and the
only outcomes are those where rm 1 either captures the whole market or shares the






> p2    + t: All price pairs below line (1) support interior solutions.
Zone C belongs to this set.
Finally, let us consider zone D. No equilibrium with corner solutions exists here,
because any rm with zero sales can decrease its price and gain a positive share of
the market up to full coverage. In contrast, equilibria in which both forms have a
positive share can exist here. Any deviation from the equilibrium prices in zone D
is not protable38. The only protable deviation is region I for rm 2 and region II
38For example, if consumers observe a price pair (pk; pl ) in Region III, they assign Dk = 0:
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Figure 18: Equilibria Set in Region III











> p1    + t. This set lies between line (1) and (2) in Fig.5.
Summing up, when  > t, multiple equilibria exist. In zone A, price pairs con-
stitute equilibria with D1 = 0; D1 = 1 or D1 =
p2 p1+t 
2(t ) : In zone B, equilibrium
















> p2    + t). Finally, in zone D, any combination of prices support





Advertising Response to New Entry
3.1 Introduction
Following a seminal paper by Bain (1956), advertising became an important and
credible tool through which incumbent rms can limit, regulate or even deter entry.
More recently, Sutton (1991) empirically supported this idea and added that adver-
tising can also alter the market structure. Despite the obvious entry deterrence e¤ect
of advertising, little research has been done to explain the advertising behavior of in-
cumbent rms when they do not block, but accommodate new entry. A set of papers
devoted to entry accommodation mainly consists of empirical studies which measure
advertising responses to new entry, or consider what market characteristics (e.g. con-
centration ratio) can explain a signicant advertising response of incumbent to new
entry (e.g. Cubbin and Domberger, 1988; Thomas, 1999). However, no theoretical
foundation is provided to explain this response.
The present paper is motivated by the research of Cubbin and Domberger (1988),
where the authors examine advertising responses to new entries of incumbent rms
using data on 42 companies in 17 consumer good industries. Their empirical research
suggests signicant39 changes in advertising intensity of 16 companies: ve companies
reduced their advertising intensity after entries and eleven companies increased their
advertising expenditures. Cubbin and Domberger further show that a positive reaction
(increase in advertising) to the entry is highly expected when the incumbent is a
dominant rm in the industry and its market is either static or declining. In other
39The authors use a model of structural breaks to see how incumbent rms react to new entry.
The breaks happen at the date of the new entry in a given industry. Corresponding dummy variables
indicate a value of the reaction. Their estimates are statistically signicant at 95% level in 16 cases.
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words, a dominant rm ghts for its market share more aggressively if the market is
not growing.
The empirical research of Cubbin and Domberger (1988) o¤ers an evidence that
incumbent rms indeed react to new entries40. However, their paper does not provide
a theoretical framework that could explain why di¤erent rms (even in the same in-
dustries) choose di¤erent advertising strategies: some of them reduce advertising and
others increase their advertising intensities. Moreover, nothing is known about how
the advertising response of an incumbent depends on the size of the entry: whether
greater entry makes an incumbent rm more or less aggressive in advertising.
The present paper considers four di¤erent types of advertising: complementary
advertising, informative advertising, persuasive advertising changing a distribution of
consumer preferences (business-stealing) and persuasive advertising enhancing prod-
uct di¤erentiation. There are two research questions stated in the paper. The rst
one considers if di¤erent types of advertising lead to di¤erent reactions of an incum-
bent rm in the case of entry accommodation. In fact, as shown in Appendix 3A,
incumbent rms react di¤erently to new entries. The second question considers how
advertising response is related to the size of the entry. Specically, it is of great in-
terest to know: if greater entry makes an incumbent rm more or less aggressive in
advertising if entry is exogenous; and if more intensive advertising can limit new entry
when the number of entering rms is endogenously determined.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related literature.
Section 3.3 considers the models of duopoly and multiple entry. Sections 3.4 and 3.5
are results and conclusion respectively.
3.2 Literature Review
Economic analysis of advertising begins with Marshall (1890, 1919) and Chamber-
lin (1933). Prevailing at that time, the neoclassical school did not consider advertising
40A summary and an interpretation of the empirical results of Cubbin and Domberger (1988) are
presented in Appendix 3A.
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as a way to inuence the functioning of the markets, since neoclassical principles as-
sumed complete information, full rationality and xed preferences. Moreover, under
the assumption of competition, only market price determines supply and demand de-
cisions and thus there is no purpose in advertising. However, Marshall (1890, 1919)
argued that advertising has two economic roles: on the one hand, it can convey use-
ful market information and thus it is constructive; on the other hand, it can really
persuade consumers to switch between sellers and therefore it is combative. Later,
Chamberlin (1933) integrated advertising in his model of product di¤erentiation by
arguing that advertising is a source and an attribute of product di¤erentiation. Fol-
lowing his thought, advertising creates entry barriers, decreases demand elasticity
and redistributes market shares, since it is able to change the tastes and preferences
of consumers. These conclusions of Chamberlin (1933) and the development of the
theory of imperfect competition motivated a more detailed study of the economics of
advertising.
Modern economics points out three approaches to advertising: persuasive, infor-
mative and complementary. Persuasive advertising is the rst view on advertising.
It was introduced by Chamberlin (1933) and implies that advertising is a way that
rms can change the tastes and preferences of consumers, create entry barriers and
obtain market power. This theoretical approach was then empirically veried by Co-
manor and Wilson (1969, 1974). In their research, the authors show that market
power measured as prot rates is strongly and signicantly dependent on advertising
intensity. Their conclusions imply that advertising may have a real entry-deterrence
e¤ect. This result is parallel to the one of Sutton (1974), who shows that advertis-
ing intensity reaches higher levels in oligopolies and moderately concentrated markets
with di¤erentiated products. The latter case is discussed in Fehr and Stevik (1998),
where the authors considered three di¤erent ways that persuasive advertising is used
in a duopoly. Their results suggest that when rms compete in persuasive advertising,
changing consumerstastes or reservation prices, they result in a wasteful advertising
war and thus both would be better o¤ if the rms could agree not to advertise. In
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contrast, persuasive advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation benets both, since
it makes market demand less elastic and softens price competition. In Bloch and
Manceau (1999), the authors show how business-stealing persuasive advertising can
shift the distribution of consumerspreferences towards the advertised product and
thus it can steal consumers from rivals. Persuasive advertising is therefore socially
overprovided and anticompetitive.
The second approach is related to the Chicago school and initiated by Stigler. In
his study, Stigler (1961) considers an informative role of advertising. Particularly, he
assumes that markets with full information are not real and therefore consumers lack
necessary information on prices, product characteristics and the existence of sellers
and products in general. Informative advertising can remedy information asymme-
try and improve market performance. These ideas motivated research on informative
advertising, for example, Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and the in-
teraction of advertising and search. In the latter case, when consumers face searching
costs, advertising provides consumers with market information and stimulates search
(e.g. Robert and Stahl,1993). It also allows rms to retain positive prots with high
searching costs (e.g. Anderson and Renault, 2006) and nally it can expand demand
(e.g. Konishi and Sandfort, 2002).
A complementary view on advertising is the third approach. It is rstly introduced
in Becker and Stigler (1977) and then developed in Becker and Murphy (1993). This
approach implies that advertising is a good in itself and thus it directly enters the
utility function of consumers. Consequently, rms can directly inuence consumers
willingness to pay through advertising. For example, complementary advertising can
take the form of an image or brand-building advertising, or advertising developing
the social-economic attributes of the advertised good. Therefore, advertising rms
are able to increase a consumers valuation for the good and reservation price respec-
tively. Sutton (1991, 2012) uses brand advertising (which is purely complementary
advertising) to study how the sunk costs of advertising inuence the entry. He nds
that the harder (more expensive) it is to develop a brand, the greater the number of
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rms in the market. In contrast, the cheaper it is to advertise, the fewer rms will
remain in the market. Sutton explains it with an endogenous sunk cost approach,
a special type of sunk costs that limit the level of concentration in the industry.
Recently, this approach was used by Etro (2014) and Senyuta and Zigic (2016) to
investigate the entry e¤ect of R&D outlays.
Di¤erent types of advertising (or view on advertising) predict di¤erent e¤ects on
market functioning. Persuasive and complementary advertising increase market power
and thus are anticompetitive. On the contrary, informative advertising remedies in-
formation problems and thus promotes competition, since better informed consumers
become more sensitive to price changes. Welfare e¤ects therefore also vary depending
on the nature of advertising.
One of the most interesting questions related to the economics of advertising is
how incumbent rms use advertising when they expect a new entry. Comanor and
Wilson (1974) have empirically shown that rms use advertising to secure market
power. Advertising creates reputation, product di¤erentiation, and high penetration
costs to entrants. Thus advertising is able to deter entry if incumbent rms are not
willing to allow a new entry.
When incumbent rms do not consider entry deterrence protable, they may ac-
commodate a new entry. In this case, however, incumbent rms may also change their
advertising strategies if new entry occurs. This phenomenon is empirically shown in
Cubbin and Domberger (1988). The authors investigate the advertising behavior of
incumbent rms in 17 consumer goods industries and conclude that pre-entry ad-
vertising intensity signicantly di¤ers from post-entry advertising. Particularly, they
nd that a positive response is highly expected among dominant rms in declining
or stagnant markets. In other words, larger rms have more to lose and thus they
aggressively ght for their market share by the means of advertising. The authors also
nd that di¤erent rms demonstrate di¤erent responses: some of them increase their
advertising intensity and others reduce their advertising. This result is interesting but
the authors do not suggest any explanation why rms demonstrate di¤erent reactions.
84
Using di¤erent approaches to advertising, the present paper answers what explains
the di¤erent advertising responses of incumbent rms in the case of entry accommo-
dation. In addition, the paper considers multiple entry and studies how advertising
response depends on the number of new rms when entry is exogenous and how the
size of the endogenous entry depends on the advertising strategy of the incumbent
rm.
3.3 Model
The model considers four types of advertising and studies whether an incumbent
rm overinvests or underinvests in advertising when it accommodates an entrant. One
has to understand underinvestment and overinvestment as accommodation strategies
coined in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). Following their theory, when an incumbent
rm accommodates an entrant, it overinvests if it strategically increases its advertising
to maximize prot41. In contrast, an incumbent underinvests when it strategically
reduces its advertising to maximize prot when it allows entry. Depending on the
nature of post-entry competition Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) classify overinvestment
into Fat Cat and Top Dog business strategies, and underinvestment into Puppy Dog
and Lean and Hungry Look.
This paper identis what business strategy is chosen when an incumbent signif-
icantly reacts with a change in advertising intensity to the entrant. Four types of
advertising are analyzed: complementary advertising, persuasive advertising changing
the distribution of tastes and preferences, persuasive advertising enhancing product
di¤erentiation, informative advertising expanding demand.
41Both underinvestment and overinvestment are compared to the pre-entry level of (advertising)
investment (or to the level of non-strategic investment). When a new entry occurs, an incumbent rm
overinvests if it exceeds the pre-entry (non-strategic) level. The reverse holds for underinvestment.
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3.3.1 Duopoly
The model uses a framework of horizontal product di¤erentiation a la Hotelling.
It considers a post-entry duopoly market where an incumbent and entrant are located
at the edges of a unit line. The location of given consumer i is shown by xi uni-
formly distributed on [0; 1] : When an incumbent accommodates, the rms compete
in prices, although the incumbent reacts to the entry with a change in advertising,
so post-entry competition is conditional on the strategic choice of the incumbents
advertising. It is assumed that the incumbent chooses advertising optimally and it
is implemented e¤ectively42. Advertising technique is explained by its corresponding
e¤ect on demand and is dened by a function of advertising expenditures A(a), where
a is an advertising intensity43 of incumbent. This function is increasing and convex
in a: A0(a) > 0; A00(a) > 0; A(0) = 0. Marginal costs are constant and normalized
to zero. At the rst stage the incumbent decides on strategic advertising. At the
second stage entry occurs and rms choose their outputs and prices simultaneously.
Case 1. Complementary advertising
Following the idea of Stigler and Becker (1977) and Murphy and Becker (1993),
complementary advertising implies that advertising directly enters the utility function
of consumers because it complements an advertised good. This type of advertising
increases a consumers reservation price since the consumer possesses preferences for
complementary advertising. Examples of this kind of advertising are image advertising
or any advertising delivering social status when the advertised good is consumed.
Additionally, complementary advertising is used to build a brand name or image
associated with an advertised product.
If an incumbent decides to invest in complementary advertising, the advertising
should inuence the reservation price. So when consumer i buys from the incumbent,
42All advertising messages reach consumers and none are lost. Advertising is correctly understood
by consumers.
43Advertsing intensity is a common notation for the amount of advertising produced by rms. It
can be measured in units of advertising, the target fraction of consumers or a share of advertising
expenditures in total revenue.
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Figure 19: Complementary Advertising
her utility is U1(xi) = R+R(a)  txi   p1 and if she buys from the entrant U2(xi) =
R  t(1 xi) p2: The value of t is a measure of product di¤erentiation. A function of
R(a) shows how complementary advertising inuences the reservation price44, while
R stands for an objective valuation of the good (it is similar to both incumbent and
entrant). Figure 19 demonstrates that advertising shifts up a graph of willingness-to-
pay by R(a) if consumers buy from the incumbent. In turn, this changes the location
of indi¤erent consumer bx to bx(a):
As in any model a la Hotelling the location of the indi¤erent consumer is deter-
mined by condition U1(bx) = U2(bx) which is identical to the following equation:
R +R(a)  tbx  p1 = R  t(1  bx)  p2 or
bx = R(a) + p2   p1 + t
2t
All consumers with xi lower than bx buy from the incumbent and a share of (1 bx)
44Since R(a) shows the utility from complementary advertising, R(a) has regular features of utility
function: R0(a) > 0; R00(a) < 0:
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buy from the entrant45. Prot functions are formed in a regular manner:
1(p1; p2; a) = p1





2(p1; p2; a) = p2

1  R(a) + p2   p1 + t
2t

Joint rst order conditions are determined by the partial derivatives of the prot










 R(a)  2p2 + p1 + t
2t
= 0
The best response functions are given by p1(p2; a) =
R(a)+p2+t
2










: As one can see, complementary advertising of an incumbent reduces the
markup of an entrant which in turn indicates its aggressiveness.

















The term in the rst brackets is the strategic e¤ect of complementary advertising
and the term in the second brackets is the direct e¤ect. Following the approach of
Tirole and Fudenberg (1984), the direct e¤ect is the e¤ect of the strategic investment
that directly inuences the prot function. Strategic e¤ect, in turn, inuences the
prot function through the choice of the strategic variable of the rival. SinceR0(a) > 0;
strategic e¤ect is negative, the incumbent underinvests in complementary advertising
45Since the paper is focused on accommodation only, interior solutions only are considered. Corner
solutions are exactly the cases of the entry-deterrence and thus they are omitted. A condition on
accommodation is in Appendix 3C.
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and the corresponding business strategy is Puppy Dog. Enhancing the value of the
advertised good for consumers, the incumbent is able to capture a bigger share of the
market and increase its markup, while relatively lowering the valuation of the entrants
good46. A comparison of strategic and non-strategic47 complementary advertising is
shown in Appendix 3B.
Case 2. Persuasive advertising changing the distribution of tastes and preferences
Persuasive advertising changes consumerstastes and preferences but does not di-
rectly enter the utility function of consumers48. Fehr and Stevik (1998) explain the
role of persuasive advertising and conclude that it either shifts consumers prefer-
ences towards the advertised product or increases product di¤erentiation. In the rst
case, persuasive advertising changes the distribution of tastes and preferences, i.e.
in terms of the present model it shifts the location of the indi¤erent consumer and
thus captures a part of consumers located near the entrant. Figure 20 demonstrates
that the distribution of consumers is shifted with persuasive advertising. Since con-
sumers are distributed uniformly, this change in distribution is a horizontal shift of
the willingness-to-pay curves to the right. A function of x(a) shows a shift in the lo-
cation of an indi¤erent consumer so that the incumbent steals x(a) part of consumers
located next to the entrant49.
bx = p2   p1 + t
2t
+ x(a)
The incumbent sells to bx share of the market and the entrant obtains a residual share
46In this sense, complementary advertising is similar to vertical di¤erentiation when an incumbent
invests in higher quality.
47When incumbent rm does not take into account the strategic e¤ect of advertising that it has
on post-entry action of the entrant, the incumbent rm acts non-strategically. In other words, the
incumbent chooses advertising intensity based on the direct e¤ect of advertising only. While when it
considers both strategic and direct e¤ects of advertising together, it acts strategically. If non-strategic
advertising is smaller (greater) than strategic, the incumbent overinvests (underinvests).
48Persuasive advertising does not enter the utility function directly as goods or complementary
advertising do. Instead, it enters the utility function indirectly, changing the relation between the
goods. In other words, it a¤ects the mathematical form of the utility function.
49More intensive advertising shifts demand more and thus x0(a) > 0; although the marginal e¤ec-
tiveness of advertising decreases x00(a) < 0:
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Figure 20: Persuasive Advertising Changing Distribution of Tastes and Preferences
of (1  bx). The resulting prot functions are as follows:
1(p1; p2; a) = p1






2(p1; p2; a) = p2





Joint rst order conditions are determined by the partial derivatives of the prot




p2   2p1 + t
2t




 2p2 + p1 + t
2t
  x(a) = 0
Reaction functions are dened by p1(p2; a) =
2tx(a)+p2+t
2
, p2(p1; a) =
 2tx(a)+p1+t
2







advertising reduces the entrants markup and thus lowers the entrants protability.
In turn, it shows that the incumbent is a tough competitor.












The term in the rst brackets is a the strategic e¤ect of persuasive advertising
and the term in the second brackets is the direct e¤ect. Since x0(a) > 0 strategic
e¤ect is negative, the incumbent underinvests in persuasive advertising that changes
the distribution of tastes and preferences, thus the corresponding business strategy is
Puppy Dog. A comparison of strategic and non-strategic persuasive advertising is in
Appendix 3B.
Case 3. Persuasive advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation
The second type of persuasive advertising enhances product di¤erentiation or
brand loyalty. In both cases persuasive advertising makes demand less elastic and
thus increases market power. In the framework of the given model, advertising inu-
ences the value of t and hence changes the slope of the willingness-to-pay curves50.
Figure 21 demonstrates that these graphs become steeper. To see how advertising
a¤ects post-entry competition, one has to look at the location of the indi¤erent con-
sumer, prot functions and response functions. A point of the indi¤erent consumer
is the same as in a traditional model of Hotelling. However, the degree of product
di¤erentiation is the function of advertising in the present setting: bx = p2 p1+t(a)
2t(a)
.
1(p1; p2; a) = p1





2(p1; p2; a) = p2

1  p2   p1 + t(a)
2t(a)

Joint rst order conditions are determined by the partial derivatives of the prot
50The function of t(a) shows how persuasive advertising changes the degree of product di¤er-
entiation. Higher advertising intensity results in greater perceived di¤erences between products,
t0(a) > 0:
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Figure 21: Persuasive Advertising Enhancing Product Di¤erentiation










 2p2 + p1 + t(a)
2t(a)
= 0
The best response functions are given by p1(p2; a) =
p2+t(a)
2




thus prices are p1(a) = t(a), p2(a) = t(a): Persuasive advertising enhancing prod-
uct di¤erentiation benets both incumbent and entrant, since it decreases demand
elasticity and consequently brings market power to both. In fact, the entrant en-
joys a positive externality from the incumbents advertising because it softens price
competition.















The term in the rst brackets is the strategic e¤ect of persuasive advertising and
the term in the second brackets is the direct e¤ect. Since t0(a) > 0 strategic e¤ect
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is positive, the incumbent overinvests in advertising and hence the corresponding
business strategy is Fat Cat. A comparison of strategic and non-strategic persuasive
advertising is in Appendix 3B.
Case 4. Informative advertising
Informative advertising provides consumers with market information like prices,
product characteristics, usage instructions, availability, and existence of the advertised
product. It thus increases demand elasticity. Literature on informative advertising
usually considers advertising as a way to bring new customers to the market either by
informing them about the existence of the advertised product or by reducing search-
ing costs51. In the latter case consumers with high searching costs are motivated to
participate in the market. In either case informative advertising expands the demand
for the advertising rm. In the framework of the given model, informative advertis-
ing brings additional customers to the incumbent, which is shown by '(a)52: Prot
functions are as follows:
1(p1; p2; a) = p1






2(p1; p2; a) = p2

1  p2   p1 + t
2t

Joint rst order conditions are determined by the partial derivatives of the prot




p2   2p1 + t
2t




 2p2 + p1 + t
2t
= 0
The best response functions are p1(p2; a) =
2t'(a)+p2+t
2




51See for example Stigler (1961), Butters (1977), Grossman&Shapiro (1984), Konishi&Sandfort
(2002).
52If the incumbents advertising intensity is a, informative advertising attracts '(a) new customers:
'0(a) > 0; '00(a) < 0:
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. Informative advertising benets both
rms because the incumbent rm has shifted out its demand curve while not stealing
customers from the entrant.











The term in the rst brackets is the strategic e¤ect of informative advertising and
the term in the second brackets is the direct e¤ect. Since '0(a) > 0 strategic e¤ect
is positive, the incumbent overinvests in advertising and hence the corresponding
business strategy is Fat Cat. A comparison of strategic and non-strategic informative
advertising is in Appendix 3B.
3.3.2 Multiple Entry
Let us now consider a multiple entry case where one incumbent accommodates
several entrants. The incumbent anticipates this entry and invests in advertising
which can be of four types, as in the previous chapter. Two di¤erent frameworks are
going to be studied: exogenous entry (the number of entrants is xed) and endogenous
entry (free-entry condition). The rsts approach demonstrates how the advertising
reaction of the incumbent depends on the competitive pressure (number of entries).
The second one shows how the advertising response to entry inuences the equilibrium
number of entries.
Post-entry market is characterized by the following inverse demand functions53 of
incumbent i and N identical entrants e:
53These inverse demand functions are derived from quadratic utility function as done in Dixit
(1979).
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where xi and xe are sales of the incumbent and one representative entrant; d; b; 
are demand parameters.
The incumbent can inuence the parameters of the indirect demand functions by
choosing what type of advertising is going to be used:
Complementary advertising increases the value of the incumbents product for a
consumer and thus changes the value of d in the inverse demand function of the
incumbent. Therefore d(a) is a function of advertising a, such that d0(a) > 0; d00(a) <
0:
Persuasive advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation decreases the degree of
product substitutability. Parameter  indicates how close products of entrants are
related to the incumbents, if  = 0 products are not related in consumption, if  = 1
these goods are perfect substitutes. The incumbent can decrease the value of  by
means of advertising, such that 0(a) < 0:
Persuasive advertising changing the distribution of tastes and preferences steals
consumers from potential entrants. It is also known as business-stealing advertising.
Informative advertising attracts new consumers and expands the market. It makes
market demand more elastic since consumers become more sensitive to the change in
prices. This can be captured by the reduction in parameter b, b0(a) < 0, that is
responsible for the market capacity and demand function slope.
Advertising technology is described by an advertising expenditure functionA(a); A0(a) >
0; A00(a) > 0: Variable production costs are normalized to zero, xed cost is equal to
F:
As in the previous chapter, the incumbent anticipates and accommodates entries.
At the rst stage of the game the incumbent invests in advertising and then at the sec-
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ond stage competes with entrants in quantities, so xi and xe are strategic substitutes.
Post-entry competition is simultaneous and non-cooperative.
Case 1. Complementary Advertising
In the second stage of the game, prot functions of the incumbent and of a repre-
sentative entrant look as follows:
i = xi
 














First order conditions of the prot optimization problems are as follows:
@i
@xi






= d  2bxe   b
N 1X
 e6=e
x e   bxi = 0











: There are N
identical entrants so
PN






















Exogenous entry. The total e¤ect of complementary advertising on the incum-











: The rst part of the total e¤ect is the
strategic e¤ect of advertising and the second part is the direct e¤ect. In the case of
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complementary advertising, strategic e¤ect is equal to N
2xi d
0(a)
(N(2 2)+2) > 0; meaning that
the incumbent overinvests in complementary advertising. The corresponding strategy
is Top Dog.
The advertising rule is described by the FOC with respect to a: di(a)
da
= 0 This
can be computed as the following condition:
d0(a)

2(N + 1)2d(a)  2N(N + 1)d
b(N(2  2) + 2)2

= A0(a)
To see how advertising changes with N; one has to check the sign of da
dN
: This




: By denition, the


















2(N + 1)(d(a)  d)  2dN





< 0; the advertising response to the entry decreases with the number
of entrants: da
dN
< 0: It means that if the incumbent rm responds to the entry with
complementary advertising, its advertising decreases with the number of entrants.
Vives (2008) proposes the decomposition of the total e¤ect of demand parameter
on strategic investment. In particular, the author computes how competitive pressure
parameters (like the number of rms and market capacity) a¤ect R&D through their
e¤ect on the rms demand and market price. This approach of Vives (2008) is
also applicable in the case of strategic advertising. By backward induction, at the
rst stage of the game the incumbent chooses how much to invest in complementary
advertising. His prot function is thus i(a;N) = xi(a) pi(xi(a;N); xe(a;N); N)  













































































xi(a;N) + pi(xi(a;N); xe(a;N); N)
i
is equal to zero because of the
FOC with respect to xi.













D(a;N)P (a;N)  A0(a) and da
dN










The rst term @D(a;N)
@N
P (a;N) is the demand e¤ect of N on advertising and the
second term @P (a;N)
@N
D(a;N) is the price e¤ect of N . This decomposition makes it
possible to separate the two e¤ects of N: The demand e¤ect of the competitive pres-
sure (number of rms N) shows how the size of the entry inuences the advertising
decision of the incumbent rm through the change in residual demand for the in-
cumbent. Particularly, it indicates a change in marginal sales due to one additional
entry. The price e¤ect of competitive pressure shows how the size of entry a¤ects
advertising through its inuence on the incumbents price. Intuitively, it denes how
the incumbents marginal protability of advertising changes with a new entry.









2 < 0; de-
mand e¤ect of N is negative. It means that each additional entrant reduces marginal
revenue of advertising, which in turn gives an incentive to reduce advertising. In






Complementary advertising is price-increasing by its nature, because it enhances the
value of the product. As a result, it increases markup, which gives an incentive to
stimulate advertising activity. The total e¤ect da
dN
is negative meaning that demand
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e¤ect exceeds the price e¤ect and incumbent rm reduces its advertising as entry
becomes greater.
Endogenous entry. Free entry implies that the equilibrium number of entrants








To see how the size of entry depends on the advertising of the incumbent rm, one











This shows that when entry is endogenous, the equilibrium number of entrants is
decreasing in complementary advertising. This result is explained by the fact that
complementary advertising increases the value of the incumbents good to consumers
and thus captures greater market share and reduces the residual demand for potential
entrants, because all consumers are willing to purchase from the incumbent. Free
entry condition therefore results in fewer entries in the industry.
This result supports the conclusion of Sutton (1991, 2012) where the author studies
complementary advertising as an endogenous sunk cost to build a brand (or increased
perceived quality). Sutton concludes that the easier (cheaper) it is to advertise, the
fewer rms remain in the market and vice versa. In the framework of the present
model, cheaper advertising technology results in a decrease in A(a) which leads to
higher advertising outlays. And since for complementary advertising dN
da
< 0; one can
see that an increase in advertising leaves a smaller number of rms in the industry. In
turn, it implies that cheaper advertising leads to fewer rms as it is in Sutton (1991,
2012)
Case 2. Persuasive advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation
This kind of advertising lowers the value of , which reects the degree of substi-
tutability of competing products. At the second stage of the game, prot functions


















First order conditions of the prot optimization problems are as follows:
@i
@xi






= d  2bxe   b
N 1X
 e6=e
x e   b(a)xi = 0











: There are N identical
entrants so
PN





















Exogenous entry. Total e¤ect of this kind of advertising on the incumbents











: The rst part of the total e¤ect is the strategic
e¤ect of advertising and the second part is the direct e¤ect. Strategic e¤ect is equal





0(a): The sign of the strategic e¤ect depends on the
sign of
 
2 +N(2(a)  4(a) + 2)






In this case the incumbent underinvests and the corresponding business strategy is





overinvests and the corresponding business strategy is Top Dog. These results show
that a more competitive environment (larger N and lower product di¤erentiation)
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makes the incumbent rm advertise more aggressively. The rm tries to di¤erentiate
itself from its rivals as much as possible if the initial  is rather high. In contrast, if
initial product di¤erentiation is rather low, the incumbent underinvests. It is worth





0.59. In turn, it means that for any N and any equilibrium   0:59; the incumbent
rm underinvests. Since advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation reduces the
equilibrium value of (a); the situation with underinvestment becomes more probable.
By backward induction, at the rst stage of the game the incumbent chooses how
much to invest in advertising. Its prot function is thus i(a) = xi(a) pi(a) A(a) F








To see how advertising changes with N; one has to check the sign of da
dN
: This value
is positive for N  4 or  < 2 and negative for  > 2 and N > 454: Therefore the
advertising response to the entry is decreasing in the number of entrants if competitive
pressure is rather high (larger N and lower product di¤erentiation). In contrast, if the
environment is not much competitive, the incumbent rm increases its advertising,
since advertising becomes more protable and e¤ective. As N approaches innity, the
threshold 2 tends to 0.71. It implies that for any N and any equilibrium 
 < 0:71 the
incumbent rm increases its advertising in response to a larger entry. Since advertising
enhancing product di¤erentiation reduces the equilibrium value of (a); a situation
with da
dN
> 0 becomes more probable.





P (a;N) + @P (a;N)
@N
D(a;N): The rst term @D(a;N)
@N
P (a;N) is the demand e¤ect
of N on advertising and the second term @P (a;N)
@N
D(a;N) is the price e¤ect of N .





> 0 and derivative






2 < 0, the demand e¤ect of entry is negative. It means that
each additional entrant reduces the marginal revenue of advertising, which in turn
gives an incentive to reduce advertising. In contrast, the price e¤ect is positive, since




(N(2 2(a))+2)3 > 0: Product di¤er-
entiation advertising is price-increasing by its nature since it reduces price elasticity.
It thus increases markup, which gives an incentive to stimulate advertising activity.
If the total e¤ect da
dN
is positive, then the price e¤ect exceeds the demand one and




Endogenous entry. Free entry implies that the equilibrium number of entrants
is determined by zero-prot condition: e = xe p






  F = 0:
To see how the size of entry depends on the advertising of the incumbent rm, one







=  0(a)2 +N(2  4(a) + 
2(a))
(2  (a))(2  2(a))
As in the case with the sign of the strategic e¤ect, the sign of dN
da
depends on the
sign of 2 + N(2   4(a) + 2(a)): It is positive equilibrium N  2 or  < 1. In
contrast, it is negative for N > 2 and  > 1: A limit of 1 equals 0:59 meaning
that for any N and any equilibrium  < 0:59; a sign of dN
da
is always positive. Since
advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation reduces equilibrium ; the situation
with dN
da
> 0 becomes more probable.
If dN
da
is positive then the incumbents advertising increases the equilibrium number
of entries. The incumbent increases the equilibrium degree of product di¤erentiation
(lowers ). This result is logically expected since a higher degree of product di¤er-
entiation expands residual demand for entrants and thus allows more entries. For
example, these results are similar to Zigic (2012), where it is shown that when com-
peting products are less alike, competition becomes softer and more rms enter in
equilibrium.
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Case 3. Business-stealing advertising
When an incumbent rm uses business-stealing advertising, it persuades consumers
to buy its products by shifting their preferences towards the incumbents product. In
other words, the incumbent captures some portion of s(a) consumers with advertising,
s0(a) > 0. There are N identical entrants and thus every entrant loses s(a)
N
potential
market share from the business-stealing advertising of the incumbent. Therefore prot
functions for the incumbent and N identical entrants look as follows:
i = (xi + s(a))
 






















= d  bxi   b
NX
e=1
xe   b(xi + s(a)) = 0
@e
@xe
= d  bxe   b
N 1X
 e6=e




























Exogenous entry. Total e¤ect of this kind of advertising on the incumbents











: The rst part of the total e¤ect is the
strategic e¤ect of advertising and the second part is the direct e¤ect. Strategic e¤ect
is equal to  (xi+s(a))b(2+N)s
0(a)
(2(N+1) 2N) < 0 and implies that the incumbent rm underinvests
in advertising if it wants to use business-stealing advertising. The corresponding
business strategy is Lean and Hungry Look.






0(a): It is positive, meaning that the incumbent
rm advertises more intensively if entry is large and less intensively if entry is small.





P (a;N) + @P (a;N)
@N
D(a;N): The rst term @D(a;N)
@N
P (a;N) is the demand e¤ect
of N on advertising and the second term @P (a;N)
@N
D(a;N) is the price e¤ect of N .











0; the demand e¤ect of N is positive. Because of the fact that larger entry reduces
residual demand of the incumbent, the only way to compensate this loss is to steal
consumers from the rivals with advertising. This stimulates advertising activity. The






Every new entry makes competition tougher and reduces prices, the only way to
compensate a loss in the markup is to capture more consumers with advertising. The
total e¤ect da
dN
is positive and the incumbent rm advertises more as entry becomes
greater.
Endogenous entry. Free entry implies that the equilibrium number of entrants
is determined by the zero-prot condition e = xe p

e   F or:
2bs(a) + 2dN + bNs(a)  dN




2d  d   2bs(a) + bs(a) + bs(a)2

(2(N + 1)  2N)
#
 F = 0:
To see how the size of entry depends on the advertising of incumbent rm, one








b(2 +    2)(2 + (2  2))
(2  2)(d(2  ) + bs(a)(2 +    2))
< 0
The sign of dN
da
is negative, it means that as the incumbent invests more in adver-
tising, entry becomes harder and fewer rms enter the market. As more consumers
are persuaded to like the incumbents product, a smaller market share is left to new-
comers and thus fewer rms can enter. Indeed, if the incumbent rm can e¤ectively
shift the preferences of consumers towards its product, it would be hard for any en-
trant to protably operate on shortened residual demand. And since business-stealing
advertising reduces the available market share for all newcomers, entry is limited.
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Case 4. Informative advertising
Informative advertising makes market demand more sensitive to the change in
prices and attracts more consumers. These e¤ects can be reected by the decrease in
b(a); b0(a) < 0: Prot functions look as follows:
i = xi
 
























= d  2b(a)xe   b(a)
N 1X
 e6=e
x e   b(a)xi = 0





and a reaction func-





: There are N identical
entrants so
PN

































: The rst part of the total e¤ect is the strategic e¤ect
of advertising and the second part is the direct e¤ect. In the case of informative
advertising the strategic e¤ect is equal to Nxid(2 )
(N(2 2)+2)b(a)b
0(a) < 0; meaning that the
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incumbent underinvests in informative advertising. The corresponding strategy is
Lean and Hungry Look.






2(N + 1)  n2
2
= A0(a)
To see how advertising changes with N; one has to check the sign of da
dN
: Using






















(2  )(1 +N  N)





< 0 the advertising response to the entry is decreasing in the number
of entrants: da
dN
< 0: It means that if the incumbent rm responds to the entry with
informative advertising, its advertising decreases in the number of entrants. As more
new rms enter the market, the less benets the incumbent gets from informative ad-
vertising. Informative advertising may increase demand but it reduces prices because
of the elasticity e¤ect.





P (a;N) + @P (a;N)
@N
D(a;N): The rst term @D(a;N)
@N
P (a;N) is the demand e¤ect
of N on advertising and the second term @P (a;N)
@N
D(a;N) is the price e¤ect of N .
Since P (a;N) =  b0(a)xi > 0 and @D(a;N)@N =
 d(2 )
b(a)(N(2 2(a))+2)
2 < 0 the demand
e¤ect of N is negative. It means that each additional entrant reduces the marginal
revenue of advertising which in turn gives an incentive to reduce advertising. The





0: Informative advertising is procompetitive by its nature since it tends to reduce
prices. Each additional entry reduces the markup of the incumbent rm and thus the
incumbent decreases its advertising outlays. The total e¤ect da
dN
is negative, meaning
that the incumbent rm advertises less as entry becomes greater.
Endogenous entry. Free entry implies that the equilibrium number of entrants









To see how the size of entry depends on the advertising of incumbent rm, one











This shows that when entry is endogenous, the equilibrium number of entrants is
increasing in informative advertising. This result is very intuitive, because informative
advertising is always procompetitive, it expands market capacity. The informative
advertising of the incumbent delivers a positive externality to entrants by giving them




In the previous section, four types of advertising were considered. In the duopoly
case, if the incumbent rm reacts to the entry with complementary advertising or
persuasive advertising changing the distribution of consumer preferences, it underin-
vests. Or else, if the incumbent rm reacts with informative advertising or persuasive
advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation, it overinvests.
So now it is possible to match these conclusions with observations from the nd-
ings of Cubbin and Domberger (1988). To start with, it is important to identify
which type of advertising suits a particular market the most. First of all, if a market
is growing (especially the market of a new product), there is no need for combative
behavior (stealing consumers from the rival with persuasive advertising) or demand
shrinking (with an enhanced product di¤erentiation). Therefore, a growing market
mainly implies either informative or complementary advertising. Informative advertis-
ing attracts more consumers and expands demand by means of informing perspective
consumers about the existence of the product, its useful characteristics, prices and so
on. Complementary advertising is usually used to build the brand name associated
with a product and it is necessary when a product is newly introduced into the mar-
ket. So, if a market is growing and the incumbent rm overinvests, it is more likely
to use informative advertising; if the incumbent underinvests in the growing market,
it is likely to use complementary advertising. However, the incumbent may also use
some persuasive advertising if the good is not new.
If a market is stagnant or declining, the product is well known to consumers and
is in the mature stage of its life-cycle. In this situation, informative advertising can-
not attract more consumers to the market, and complementary advertising cannot be
used on the mature stages of the product since brand image is already established for
mature products. Therefore, the only suitable types of advertising are those which
imply either stealing consumers from the rival or increasing the loyalty of the clien-
tele. Persuasive advertising changing the distribution of tastes and preferences steals
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customers from the rival and thus is suitable for stagnant and declining markets. Per-
suasive advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation is used to increase the loyalty
of the clientele and make the perceived di¤erence between di¤erentiated products
stronger. It increases market power and consequently markups of the incumbent.
Summing up, when a market is stagnant or declining, the incumbent rm overinvests
if it uses persuasive advertising, enhancing product di¤erentiation, and the incumbent
rm underinvests if it uses persuasive advertising, changing the distribution of tastes
and preferences.
When the incumbent rm faces multiple entry, it reacts aggressively with advertis-
ing and the corresponding business strategies are either Top Dog or Lean and Hungry
Look. However, only complementary and business-stealing advertising are anticompet-
itive, while informative advertising and advertising increasing product di¤erentiation
ease the entry of new rms. These results are explained by the fact that comple-
mentary and business-stealing advertising increase the market share of the incumbent
rm by means of a reduction in residual demand of potential entrants, that in turn
leaves a smaller market share to the rivals and thus fewer rms can enter the market.
On the contrary, informative advertising of the incumbent expands the borders of the
market and delivers a positive externality to the potential entrants. This increases the
market shares of both the incumbent and entrants, and in turn allows more entries.
As for advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation, it reduces the substitutability of
competing products and thus softens competition, making new entries protable.
When entry is exogenous, business-stealing and product di¤erentiation advertis-
ing increases in the amount of entering rms. In the rst case, greater entry reduces
market share for the incumbent rm and thus it uses more aggressive advertising to
compensate this potential loss. In the second case, greater potential entry motivates
the incumbent to di¤erentiate its product more in order to soften potential compe-
tition. The other types of advertising decrease in the amount of potential entrants,
since with exogenous entry the demand e¤ect is negative and each additional entrant
reduces the marginal revenue of advertising, which in turn leads to smaller advertising
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Figure 22: Multiple Entry
outlays.
It is important to note that advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation may have
di¤erent outcomes depending on the value of the equilibrium product di¤erentiation.
Firstly, a more competitive environment (larger entry and higher substitutability of
goods) reduces advertising due to the lower benets of advertising. However, if the
equilibrium degree of product di¤erentiation does not exceed its threshold and there-
fore stays rather high, entry and advertising are positively correlated. Secondly, ad-
vertising enhancing product di¤erentiation reduces product substitutability and thus
equilibrium  decreases, which implies that the incumbents advertising and entry are
more likely to be positively related.
All results are summarized in Figure 22.
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3.5 Conclusion
Advertising is used by rms not only to create entry barriers and deter entry,
but it can also be used as a response to new entry in the case of accommodation.
Empirical evidence suggests signicant changes in advertising patterns of incumbent
rms when they face new rms on the market. Some of them reduce their advertising
expenditures, others increase their advertising. Existing economic literature investi-
gating this phenomenon does not provide any theoretical foundation why rms react
di¤erently to new entry and does not explain how advertising response is related to
the size of the entry.
The present chapter considers four types of advertising and studies how the par-
ticular type of advertising chosen by the incumbent rm is related to the entry ac-
commodation. Specically, it investigates whether the incumbent rm overinvests or
underinvests in a particular type of advertising and how the size of the entry is related
to the advertising response.
In the case of a duopoly, when the post-entry market is organized a la Hotelling,
the incumbent tends to overinvest (increase post-entry advertising levels) in infor-
mative advertising and persuasive advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation. On
the contrary, the incumbent underinvests (decreases post-entry advertising outlays)
in complementary and business-stealing advertising.
In the case of multiple entry, when the demand structure is of Dixit (1979), the
incumbent overinvests in complementary advertising and underinvests otherwise. If
entry is exogenous, advertising that decreases substitutability of the competing prod-
ucts and business-stealing advertising is positively related to the size of entry, since, in
the rst case, greater potential competition motivates the incumbent rm to increase
perceived di¤erences between products and thus soften post-entry competition; and,
in the second case, with larger entry, business-stealing advertising is the only way
to secure a market share. When entry is endogenous, complementary and business-
stealing advertising allow fewer rms to enter the market, since both reduce residual
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demand to potential entrants. On the contrary, informative advertising and adver-
tising increasing product di¤erentiation are procompetitive and allow greater entry.
Both of them are a positive externality that benets potential entrants since both
increase market shares of all rms operating in the market.
The theoretical model considered in the present paper serves to explain observa-
tions found in the empirical research of economists which investigate the advertising
responses of incumbent rms to new entries. The model can be further extended
to incorporate dynamics and to know how incumbents react to new entries treating
advertising as an intangible asset.
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3.6 Appendix
3A Results in Cubbin and Domberger (1988)
The empirical results of Cubbin and Domberger (1988) are summarized in Table
1. There are nine categories: company name; industry where the given company
operates; year when new entry took place; market type; estimates of coe¢ cients
in the regression equations55 (intercept, trend and dummy); dummy type; response
("over" means an increase in advertising above the pre-entry levels and "under" means
a reduction in advertising under the pre-entry levels).
Some of the regressions are sketched in Figure 23. There are six examples of adver-
tising responses based on the results from Table 1: Phillips, P&G (washing-up liquids)
and Gillette demonstrate a signicant increase in their advertising expenditures after
entries; Colgate-Palmolive, P&G (shampoo) and Ellida-Gibbs show a reduction.
55The estimated equations with structural breaks are specied as follows: Ait = i+it+
I
i i+ei
if there is a jump in intercept and Ait = i + it + 
S
i it + ei if there is a change in slope. Ait is
advertising expenduture of the rm i in period t. i is a dummy variable taking the value of 0 before
entry and 1 afterwards. t = 1; 2; :::n are quarterly time-periods.
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Figure 23: Examples of regression graphs from Table 1
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3B Strategic and non-strategic advertising
Complementary advertising
When an incumbent rm decides on advertising non-strategically, it does not take
into account the strategic e¤ect it has on the entrants post-entry action. In this case
the incumbents advertising rule is p1
2t
R0(a) = A0(a) or R(a)+3t
6t
R0(a) = A0(a):
When an incumbent rm chooses advertising intensity strategically, it considers












= 0 or R(a)+3t
9t





strategic advertising is greater than strategic, which means that the incumbent un-
derinvests in complementary advertising when it accommodates an entrant.
Persuasive advertising changing the distribution of tastes and preferences

















Since the non-strategic rule suggests higher levels of advertising, an incumbent
underinvests in this kind of persuasive advertising.
Persuasive advertising enhancing product di¤erentiation






= 0 or 0 = A0(a) in a
symmetric case. So a non-strategic incumbent would not advertise at all.












= 0 or t0(a) =
A0(a):
Since the strategic rule implies positive levels of advertising, an incumbent over-
invests in persuasive advertising increasing t.
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Informative advertising
The non-strategic advertising rule is [p1'0(a)  A0(a)] = 0 or 3t+4t'(a)3 '
0(a) = A0(a).











Since the strategic rule suggests higher levels of advertising, an incumbent overin-
vests in informative advertising.
3C Accommodation vs. entry deterrence
Condition on accommodation. There is a certain set of parameters ; d; b; N; F
when an incumbent prefers to accommodate instead of deter entry. In many mod-
els with product di¤erentiation, entry deterrence is more protable when competing
products are close substitutes and accommodation is preferred when product di¤er-
entiation is rather high (as discussed in Zigic, 2012). Since the present paper only
considers cases when incumbent accommodates entries, there should be a condition

















In our model this condition always holds as a strict inequality.
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